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ABSTRACT
Despite accumulating evidence, unresolved issues remain as
to how the components of strategy, top-management
characteristics, and environment, as independent variables,
combine to affect a firm's success or failure in turning
around declining performance.

To address such issues, this

dissertation developed and tested a series of hypotheses
that investigates the effects of strategy, top-management
characteristics, and environment on performance.

Findings

show that turnaround strategy alone is insufficient to
explain differences in performance among firms.

They also

provide some support for the importance of TMG-strategy
interaction and show a limited role for the environment in a
firm's turnaround.

Additionally, the findings show some

limited support for the importance of all three factors
taken in tandem.

Methodological issues related to

classifying turnaround strategies and measuring performance
are also addressed.

viii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Increasing global competition, industrial decline,
rapid technological change, government deregulation, and
managerial complacency have contributed to performance
crises in an increasing number of firms (Hoffman, 1989;
Loomis, 1993).

These crises have prompted numerous

investigations into environmental influences on performance
decline (Argenti, 1976; Bibeualt, 1982; Lorange & Nelson,
1987; Weitzel & Jonsson,

1989; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985), as

well as strategies for halting such decline and turning
around a firm's performance (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983;
Hofer,

1980; O'Neill,

1986; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

Additionally, limited research has focused on top
management's role in turnaround processes
Barr, 1994; Stanwick,

1992).

(e.g., Barker &

Despite accumulating evidence,

unresolved questions remain as to how the components of
strategy, top-management characteristics, and environment,
as independent variables, combine to affect performance as a
criterion or outcome (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
These components, as they influence a firm's
performance, comprise the conceptual domain of this
dissertation (cf. Summer et al., 1990).

It is generally

argued that the alignment of a firm's strategy with its
prevailing external milieu (i.e., general and task
environments) affects its performance

(Hofer & Schendel,

1978; Porter, 1980; Summer et al., 1990).

In addition, a

1
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2
firm's resource pool influences its success (Barney, 1991;
Diercikx & Cool. 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992).

From a

strategic management perspective, one of the most important
resources a firm can draw upon in is the talent of its topmanagement group (Castanias & Helfat, 1991).

Taken in

tandem, the thesis of this dissertation is that a firm's
turnaround is a function of the alignment among its
environmental conditions, strategy, and top management.
This conceptual framework is outlined in Figure 1.
The notion of alignment is critical in turnaround
research. Firms that do not maintain an alignment among
strategy, top-management characteristics, and environment
will ultimately decline and eventually fail (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).

Further,

reestablishing alignment is necessary for firms to turn
around (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).

Consequently, achieving

insight into the turnaround process requires investigating
the components that permit firms to regain alignment.

A

discussion of these components as they relate to a firm's
performance —

and, by extension, turnaround —

follows.

Strategy
Research investigating the turnaround process has
focused primarily on the impact that specific turnaround
strategies have in reestablishing the aforementioned
alignment (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992;
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Strategy

TMG
Characteristics

Alignment

Performance

Environment

Figure 1.1— A conceptual model of alignment among strategy,
TMG characteristics and environment
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4
Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976).

Investigations have

generally studied whether firms should implement
retrenchment-oriented strategies (e.g., cutting costs or
downsizing operations), innovation-oriented strategies
(e.g., introducing new products), or growth-oriented
strategies (e.g., diversifying into new domains) to overcome
decline.

Studies have found evidence both supporting (e.g.,

Barker, 1992; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Robbins & Pearce,
1992) and challenging (e.g., Arogyaswamy, 1992; Hofer, 1980;
Zimmerman, 1989) the efficacy of each strategy.

These

equivocal results suggest that other components along with
strategy are important in reestablishing alignment and
turning around a firm's performance.
TMG Characteristics
A firm's top management is a second component affecting
its alignment.

Strategic decisions by a top-management

group (TMG) bridge the boundary between a firm's internal
processes and its environment (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Research based on the strategic-

choice perspective (Child, 1972) and the Carnegie School
decision-making framework (Cyert & March, 1963; March &
Simon, 1958) proposes that such decisions can be affected by
TMG characteristics (e.g., functional background, career
experiences, and stock ownership).1 Varying TMG
characteristics provide firms with different talents (Bantel
& Jackson, 1989; Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Michel & Hambrick,
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5
1992; Miles & Snow, 1978; Norburn & Birley, 1988), produce
different TMG motives (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt,
1989), and may prompt different interpretations of
organizational and environmental stimuli (Hambrick & Mason,
1984; Meyer, 1982; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984; Thomas,
Clark, & Gioia, 1993) that can affect strategic decision
making and, thus, a firm's alignment.

Additionally, because

firms pursue myriad strategies whose implementation may
require diverse TMG talents, the extent to which TMG talents
match strategies should improve performance (Gupta, 1988;
Hambrick, 1987; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Thomas, Litschert,
& Ramaswamy, 1991).

The role of TMGs in turnaround has

received only limited empirically investigation, but some
studies suggest that TMGs may be an important component in
realigning firms with their environments (Ford, 1985; Hofer,
1980; O'Neill, 1986; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Stanwick,
1992) .2
Environment
A third component affecting alignment is the
environment with which firms interact (Andrews, 1971; Hofer
& Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980).

The organizational

literature varies in its view of environments from totally
determining (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Scherer, 1980) to
predominately controlling (Lieberson & O'Conner, 1971;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977; Schmalensee, 1985) to constraining
(Child, 1972; Porter, 1980) a firm's behavior and
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performance.

It is generally argued (e.g., Astley & Van de

Ven, 1983; Child, 1972; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1988;
Haveman, 1992; Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Hrebeniak & Joyce, 1985),
however, that a firm has some latitude for adapting to
environmental demands.

Turnaround studies have investigated

some environmental factors affecting performance (e.g.,
business-cycle or life-cycle stage; Bibeault, 1982; Morrow &
Busenitz, 1993).

In general, however, most studies have

focused on decline resulting from internal causes (e.g.,
increasing firm inefficiency) rather than from environmental
causes (e.g., shrinking industry sales).

To regain

alignment, however, a firm must achieve fit with critical
contingencies in its environment (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).
Thus, gaining insight into the turnaround process requires
investigating the impact that environmental factors have on
a firm's ability to turn around.
Performance
As noted, it is generally argued that increasing
alignment among a firm's strategy, top-management
characteristics, and environment results in better
performance —

and, by extension, turnaround (Andrews, 1971;

Summer et al., 1990).

Questions remain, however, regarding

how to measure performance in turnaround situations (Barker
& Mone, 1994; Winn, 1993).

Turnaround studies have employed

several measures, but little consensus exists on how to
exactly gauge "decline" and "turnaround" (Pearce & Robbins,
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1993) .

Thus, conceptual development of turnaround measures

is also important for studying the turnaround process.
In this dissertation, therefore, I develop and test a
series of hypotheses investigating the effects that
turnaround strategy, top-management characteristics, and
environment have on turnaround.

In doing so, I also examine

unresolved methodological issues in turnaround research
related to classifying turnaround strategies and measuring
performance.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
This chapter has noted the increasing incidence of
performance crises in firms and highlighted the importance
reestablishing alignment in turning around declining
performance. To examine issues related to turnaround, the
dissertation will investigate the effect that a firm's
strategy, top-management characteristics, and environment
have on turnaround.

The dissertation also examines

methodological issues related classifying turnaround
strategies and measuring performance.
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) examines previous
turnaround research and discusses key findings related to
turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment.
It also highlights shortcomings in previous research.
Chapter 3 (Theory Development) begins by developing a
strategy classification to overcome two shortcomings in
previous research, lack of standardized terminology, and use
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of aggregated strategy classification schemes.

Hypotheses

investigating the effects of turnaround strategy, TMG
characteristics, and environment on turnaround are then
developed.
Chapter 4 (Methods) describes sample selection,
measures, and methods for testing hypotheses.

The chapter

also details issues related to employing organizational
slack as a measure of performance.
Chapter 5 (Results) presents findings relating to
individual hypotheses.

These findings show that turnaround

strategy alone is insufficient to explain differences in
performance among firms.

They also provide some support for

the importance of TMG-strategy interaction and show a
limited role for the environment in a firm's turnaround.
Finally, the findings show some limited support for the
importance of all three factors taken in tandem.
Chapter 6 (Implications and Conclusion) begins by
reviewing the dissertation's results.

Next, it discusses

the implications of the reported results for turnaround
research.

It also highlights limitations of the

dissertation and concludes with a discussion of future
research avenues.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Turnaround is an attempt to halt a performance decline
that threatens a firm's long-term viability (Barker & Mone,
1992; Hofer,

1980) and, in turn, to renew its health

(Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Schendel et al.,
1976).

Indications that firm viability is threatened and a

turnaround is necessary include shrinking profit margins,
declining market share, increasing debt, and decreasing
working capital

(Bibeault, 1982; Winn, 1993).

Previous studies have investigated sundry issues
related to the effects of turnaround strategy, TMGs, and
environment on a firm's performance.

These studies are

summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 prompts several observations.

First, despite

20 years' research, the efficacy of various turnaround
strategies (e.g., retrenchment)
remains equivocal.

in reestablishing alignment

Second, the importance of matching TMG

talents to a proposed turnaround strategy has yet to be
empirically investigated.

Third, the influence that a

firm's environment may have on its turnaround has received
limited empirical attention.

Finally, empirical turnaround

studies have employed various measures to evaluate
turnaround.

Each of these observations will be discussed,

in turn.

9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2.1— Review of Turnaround Studies
Study
Schendel,
Patton, &
Riggs, 1976

Schendel &
Patton, 1976

Sample
54 firms from
40
manufacturing
industries,
1952-1971

36 matched
pairs frcsn 20
manufacturing
industries,
1952-1971

Decline
Definition
Fcur years of
uninterrupted
decline in net
income
normalized by
GNP

Sub-GNP growth
in income

Recovery
Definition
Four years of
increasing net
income,
normalized by
GNP, with
allowance for a
two year
deviation
between decline
and recovery

Key Findings
Often a combination of poor
managerial decisions and
unfavorable environmental events
cause decline.
Significant changes in management
and organizational processes often
occurred during recovery.
Major changes were necessary to
reverse decline. Over half of
turnarounds diversified (product
and geographic) and about twofifths divested divisions.
Further, efficiency turnarounds
did not cure strategic problems.

Greater-than-GNP Turnaround and non-turnaround
growth in income firms sometimes pursued the same
strategy. Thus, strategy must be
implemented efficiently and match
firms' resources to be successful.
Steadily declining performance may
be tolerated. Crisis may lie
necessary to induce action.

(Table con'd)

o
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Graham &
Richards, 1979

10 rail-based
holding
companies (5
heavy
diversifiers, 5
limited
diversifiers)
1957-76

Return on total
assets below
return available
from long-term
U.S. Treasury
bonds

Iirproving return
on total assets

Firms that diversified because of
poor performance changed top
management to bring in managers
with experience outside the
railroad industry. These firms
later divested their railroad
operations.
Firms that did not diversify did
not change top management.
(table con'd)

H
H
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Hofer, 1980

Case studies of
10 firms, 19511978

Major declines
in financial or
market position

Regaining
financial health
or market
position

Type of turnaround needed depends
on current strategic and operating
health as well as industry
characteristics.
Revenue-increasing, cost-cutting,
asset reduction, and combination
strategies comprise operating
turnaround strategies. Increasing
market share or pursuing
segmentation/niche strategy
comprise strategic turnaround
strategies.
Top management must almost always
be replaced as a precondition to
turnaround.
Management typically responded to
crisis with an operating
turnaround strategy.
(table con'd)
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O'Neill, 1981

51 banks, 1959
1978

3 consecutive
years of net
income growth at
a slower rate
than average
industry net
income growth

3 years of net
income growth
greater than
average industry
net inocsne
growth

Few management changes occurred in
either turnaround or nontumarcund firms.
Turnaround and non-turnaround
firms often inplemented the same
strategies. Consequently,
differences in management's
ability to implement the strategy
and timing of the turnaround may
be important.
Decline rates for turnaround cind
non-turnaround firms did not
differ significantly.
(table con'd)
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Bibeault, 1982

81 films, 1967
1976

3 years of
sustained, but
not necessarily
monotonic,
decline in net
incane
About 80% of
sample also
suffered one or
more years of
losses

Large increase
in profit
margins and
sales

Approximately 80% of declines were
caused by internal factors.
Firms implemented the following
turnaround strategies:
68% management process turnarounds
16% business cycle turnarounds
5% competitive environment
turnarounds
4% product breakthrough
turnarounds
About 70% of top managers were
replaced. Those that were not
replaced remained because decline
was caused by external factors,
management detected decline early,
or (in rare cases) management
took bold action.
(table con'd)
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Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983

260 mature,
industrialproduct SBUs
from PIMS data
base for 4-year
period

Average pretax
RDI less than
10%

ROI greater than
20% (n=53 SBUs)

Successful turnaround firms
pursued one of three strategies:
(1) Firms cut costs (R&D,
marketing, inventory), reduced
receivables, and increased
employee productivity and market
share. (2) Firms far below break
even implemented asset/cost
surgery. (3) Firms implemented a
piecemeal strategy of increasing
employee productivity and capacity
utilization.
Successful turnaround strategies
differed from unsuccessful
turnaround strategies.
Turnaround strategy depended on
capacity utilization and market
share.
Firms probably did not inplement
revenue generating strategies
because maturity stage of life
cycle does not allow for large
changes in ccnpetitive position.
(table con'd)
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Ramanujam,
1984

64
manufacturing
firms fran
OCMEUSTAT data
base, 1962-1979

ROI decline for
four years and
ROI at sente
point falling
below 5%

ROI greater than
5%

Most successful turnaround firms
suffered only moderate decline
whereas most unsuccessful
turnaround firms suffered severe
decline.
Successful turnaround firms had
higher numbers of acquisitions!
during decline phase than
unsuccessful turnaround firms.
Successful turnaround firms
increased slack resources
(retained earnings/equity) more
than unsuccessful turnaround firms
during recovery.
Industry growth rate was highex
for successful turnaround firms
than for unsuccessful turnaround
firms during recovery.
Successful turnaround firms were
larger than unsuccessful
turnaround firms in terms of
assets and sales.
(table oon'd)

H

U\
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Melin, 1985

6 Scandinavian
TV
manufacturers,
1970-1980

Severe profit
deterioration

Survival of
shakeout

Management competence and value
structures oriented toward growth
were inadequate during shakeout.
Centralized structure and
autocratic management led to
gradual narrowing of management
competence as the environment
changed.

O'Neill, 1986

Case study of 9
successful and
4
unsuccessful
turnaround
firms, 19701980

Not specified

Not specified

Top management was always
replaced. Five of nine firms
achieving successful turnaround
replaced CEO with insiders while
three of four firms not achieving
turnaround replaced CEO with
insiders.
Successful turnaround firms
normally had seme degree of
restructuring.
Management should be changed if
such a move will increase worker,
supplier, or customer confidence.
If replacing management will
alienate any of these
stakeholders, current management
should stay.

(table con'd)
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Pant, 1986

137 firms front
OCMFUSTAT data
base, 19701983, n= 64
successful and
73 unsuccessful
turnarounds

RCA in lowest
25% of industry
for 2 years

RCA in top 25%
of industry in
years 7 and 8

Successful turnaround firms were
generally smaller than
unsuccessful turnaround firms.
Both successful and unsuccessful
turnaround firms had higher debt
levels than their industry
averages during decline.
Successful turnaround firms,
however, had lower debt levels
during recovery.
Successful turnaround firms
exhibited seme change in ownership
from externally controlled to
owner controlled.
Industry growth rates for
successful and unsuccessful
turnaround firms were both
negative.

Zimmerman,
1986

4 case studies

Financial
decline,
increasing
customer
complaints

Return to
profitability

Turnaround is a multifaceted
process.
A new and adaptive view of the
environment is essential for
turnarounds.

(table aon'd)

H

00
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I

Zimmerman,
1989

15 firms in
automotive and
agricultural
equipment
industries for
20 year periods
between 1902
and 1987, 0=8
successful
firms and 7
unsuccessful
turnaround
firms

Decline in
profit, negative
profit or profit
below industry
average, decline
in revenue,
increasing
stakeholder
concerns

Increase in
revenue and
profit, positive
profit,
stronger market
position

Successful firms had more severe
declines than unsuccessful firms.
Successful firms exhibited better
performance in terms of efficiency
(e.g., inventory management, and
production), and became low cost
producers in the industry,
unsuccessful firms diversified or
acquired other firms.
Successful firms inplemented
small, incremental improvements to
increase quality and differentiate
products. Unsuccessful firms made
significant and abrupt product
changes.
Successful firms had CEOs with
extensive industry experience,
production or engineering
background, and long tenures.
Unsuccessful firms had CEOs with
limited industry experience, sales
or marketing backgrounds, and
short tenures.

(Table con'd)
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Arogyaswamy,
1992

204
manufacturing
firms from
VAHJEUNE
database, n=89
successful and
115
unsuccessful
turnaround
firms, 19751985

Negatively
sloped
regression line
for four years
for return on
invested
capital, net
income margin,
and change in
cash flow

Positively
sloped
regression line
for four years
for return on
invested
capital, net
income margin,
and change in
cash flow
Return on
invested capital
in the first and
last two years
of study was
positive

Both successful and unsuccessful
turnaround firms cutback in terms
of enployees, cost of goods sold,
inventories, receivables, and
selling, general and
administrative expenses.
Successful turnaround firms,
however, were able to translate
cutbacks into higher efficiency
more often than unsuccessful
turnaround firms.
Successful turnaround firms
adopted both efficiency and
rejuvenation (i.e.,
entrepreneurial) strategies more
often than unsuccessful turnaround
firms.
Adoption of efficiency strategies
during decline and recovery were
positively associated with
performance increases during
recovery.
(Table con'd)

to

o

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Barker, 1992

160 lowdiversity,
manufacturing
firms, n= 46
successful and
114
unsuccessful
turnaround
firms, 19751989

At least 3
consecutive
years of return
on investigated
capital lower
than 6-month
U.S. Treasury
bill rate, at
least one year
of negative
income, Altman's
(1988) Z-soore
below 3.00 for
at least one
year

Return on
invested capital
above U.S.
Treasury bill
rate
Assets,
employees, and
normalized sales
still greater
than 50% of
predowntum
levels

Change in strategic orientation is
positively associated with
turnaround success.
Change in CEO (either voluntary or
not) alone was not associated with
turnaround success.
level of slack resources is
positively associated with
turnaround success.
Change in CEO along with strategic
orientation is associated with
turnaround success.
(table con'd)
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Robbins &
Pearce, 1992

38 textile
manufacturers,
1976-1985

2 years of
increasing ROI
and ROS followed
by:
(1) absolute
declines in both
ROI and ROS for
a minimum of two
years
(2) rate of
decline in ROI
and ROS greater
than industry
average over two
year period

(1) At least two
consecutive
years of
absolute
increases in ROI
and ROS at a
rate greater
than industry
average
(2) Return to
predowntum ROI
and ROS levels

Firms that retrench outperform
those that do not.
Asset and cost retrenchment were
both significantly associated with
increased turnaround for high
severity firms but not low
severity.
External cause led to
entrepreneurial turnarounds while
internal cause led to efficiency
turnarounds.

(table con'd)

to

to
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Stanwick, 1992

39 matched
pairs from
OCMFUSTAT data
base, 1970-1989

3 years of
decreasing value
for Altman's Zscore and a Zsoore less that
3.00 for each
year

3 years of
increasing value
for Altman's Zscore and a Zscore of at
least 3.00 for
the last year of
turnaround

CEO succession was not
significantly higher in successful
turnaround than unsuccessful
turnaround firms.
Incidence of outside succession
were not significantly higher than
insider succession in successful
turnaround firms.
Incidence of operational,
strategic, and combination
turnaround strategies did not
differ significantly across CEOs
with different functioned,
backgrounds.
CEOs with law, finance, general
administration, or accounting
backgrounds led significantly more
(pc.10) successful turnaround
firms than CEOs with other
functional backgrounds.
Successful turnaround firms
implemented combination strategies
more often than unsuccessful
turnaround firms.
(table oon'd)

to

u>
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Morrow &
Busenitz, 1993

32 firms in
primary metals
(mature firms),
39 firms in
surgical,
medical, and
dental
instruments and
supplies
(growth firms)
from OCMEUSTAT
database, 19801990

3 years of
decreasing
return on
average
investment

Absolute change
in return on
average
investment from
the year 3 to
year 4

Mature firms that retrenched
(i.e., cut SG&A expense, interest
expense, and total assets)
improved performance more tlian
those that did not retrench.
Growth firms that retrenched also
improved performance more tlian
those that did not retrench, but
the performance improvement was
not evident until year 4.
Firms did not have to follow a
"strict" retrenchment strategy to
realize performance improvements
(e.g., seme successful turnaround
firms reduced expenses while
slightly increasing assets).
Lower debt/total asset ratios led
to better performance recovery.
Size (i.e., net sales in year 0)
was not significant in either
industry.
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Strategy
A firm's strategy is a set of decisions that aligns its
strengths and weaknesses with environmental opportunities
and threats (Andrews, 1971).

Establishing and maintaining

this alignment should result in higher performance (Summer
et al., 1990).

Consequently, turnaround research has

primarily focused on investigating the efficacy of
particular turnaround strategies in reestablishing alignment
and turning around performance.
Studies have suggested three general turnaround
strategies: retrenchment, innovation, and growth.

Empirical

attention has predominantly focused on retrenchment
strategies (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994;
Robbins & Pearce, 1992) whereas theoretical arguments have
highlighted rationales for all three strategies (Bibeault,
1982; Hedburg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976; Hofer, 1980;
Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
Retrenchment strategies involve cutting costs (e.g.,
selling, general, and administrative expenses) , liquidating
assets (e.g., unprofitable products or divisions), and other
efficiency-oriented actions to realign a firm with its
environment and turn around its performance (Robbins &
Pearce, 1992).

Innovation strategies involve increasing

marketing efforts and expanding markets for current or
adapted products (Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Zammuto &
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Cameron, 1985).

Growth strategies involve diversifying into

new business segments to reduce dependence on declining
business segments or to apply a firm's strengths to other
segments (Barker, 1992; Schendel et al., 1976; Zammuto &
Cameron, 1985).

In addition, studies have investigated

whether a firm can implement different strategies
simultaneously (e.g., expanding marketing efforts to some
segments while eliminating service in other segments; Barker
& Duhaime, 1994) or whether some ordering of strategies is
necessary for turn around (e.g., retrenchment followed by
growth; Bibeault, 1982; Robbins & Pearce,

1992).

Retrenchment strategies
The predominant model of the turnaround process
contends that firms facing decline must first achieve
financial stability through retrenchment actions before
implementing other strategies such as innovation or growth
(Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins,

1993).

According to this

model, firms will require different degrees of retrenchment
based on decline severity.
For low severity situations (e.g., declining sales or
shrinking margins), firms may regain alignment by becoming
more cost efficient (Pearce & Robbins,

1993).

For example,

firms may reduce research and development (R&D) investment
and marketing expenses, as well as drop marginally
profitable products to increase efficiency and restore
competitiveness (Hambrick, 1985; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).
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For high severity situations (e.g., imminent
bankruptcy)

firms may have to implement more drastic actions

to regain alignment.

In this situation, firms may lay off

personnel or sell entire divisions (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce &
Robbins, 1992) to stem decline.

The focus in such

situations is to reduce a firm's fixed costs and asset base
to improve efficiency and restore competitiveness (Freeman &
Cameron,

1993; Hambrick,

1985).

As noted, the majority of empirical turnaround studies
have studied the efficacy of retrenchment strategies
following performance decline.

These studies have generally

found that firms pursuing a retrenchment strategy
successfully turned around performance (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Hofer, 1980; Morrow & Busenitz, 1992; Robbins &
Pearce, 1992; Zimmerman,

1989).

Consequently, these studies

have argued that firms facing decline must initially
stabilize their financial health by retrenching prior to
making longer term adjustments (Pearce & Robbins,
Conflicting results, however, also exist.

1993).

For example,

studies have found that retrenchment is inadequate for
(Arogyaswamy, 1992) or even detrimental to (Schreuder, Van
Cayseele, Jaspers, & De Graff, 1991) a firm's turnaround
success.

Further, retrenchment may lead a firm to cut key

expenses (e.g., marketing) or sell its most valuable assets
in times of financial distress.

These actions may provide

liquidity or increased efficiency in the short term, but
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could have adverse effects on a firm's long-term recovery
(Barker & Mone, 1994).
Innovation strategy
In contrast to turning around through retrenchment,
firms may be able to innovate as a means of reestablishing
alignment.

An innovation strategy involves focusing efforts

and redirecting investments to areas that will increase
market penetration or produce new products (Hofer, 1980;
O'Neill, 1986; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).

Firms implementing

this strategy attempt to turn around by increasing sales
through such actions as increased advertising, redoubling
selling efforts, and lowering prices (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983) .
To date, studies have also provided conflicting
findings regarding the efficacy of an innovation strategy
for declining firms.

For example, Hambrick and Schecter

(1983) found that firms implementing an innovation strategy
in situations where market shares are relatively fixed
(i.e., mature industries) are unsuccessful in turning
around.

Some case studies (e.g., Hofer, 1980; O'Neill,

1986), however, have found that an innovation strategy helps
some firms reestablish alignment and turn around.
Growth strategy
A second alternative to retrenchment may be for firms
to grow out of decline.

A growth strategy involves

diversifying firms into new business lines.

Firms may
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diversify to reduce dependence on shrinking markets (Miles,
1982; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989) or to find industries
where a firm's strengths can be employed more profitably
(Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).
Conflicting evidence again exists regarding the
efficacy of a growth strategy for declining firms.
example, Schendel et al.

For

(1976) found that over half of

their sample of successful turnaround firms diversified
either in terms of product or geography, and Barker (1992)
concluded that changes in strategic orientation were
positively and significantly related to turnaround.

In

contrast, Zimmerman (1989) found that unsuccessful firms
followed diversification or acquisition strategies whereas
successful firms remained focused on attaining efficiency
within their present industries.
Review of turnaround studies indicates that firms may
have several viable strategies to help reestablish alignment
and, thus, turn around.

Conflicting findings, however,

present questions regarding the efficacy of each strategy.
This ambiguity may exist because previous studies have
failed to recognize critical differences across turnaround
situations (Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1994;
Winn, 1993), have employed different strategy
classifications, thus limiting generalizability (Pearce &
Robbins, 1993), or have used vague or broad classifications
that aggregate different strategies.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
First, studies have employed samples that include firms
facing different types of decline and turnaround, which may
have contributed to ambiguous results.

In her review of the

turnaround literature, Winn (1993) argued that different
turnaround situations exist and failure to control for these
types across samples may lead to contradictory results.

For

example, firms threatened with imminent bankruptcy face
different demands than firms that are simply underperforming
in an industry or facing moderate decline.

Additionally,

firms experiencing decline because of internal problems may
face different turnaround situations than firms declining
because of external factors (Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Staw,
Sanderlands, & Dutton, 1981).

Few studies, however, have

considered these heterogeneity problems.
Second, ambiguous results may derive from previous
studies classifying turnaround strategies in different ways.
Inconsistent terminology across these classifications has
slowed empirical progress in turnaround research as
different studies often ignore previous investigations and
adopt different terms for similar processes (Pearce &
Robbins,

1993).

For example, some studies examining the

efficacy of turnaround strategies have classified responses
as either operating or strategic turnarounds.

Operating

responses have been defined to include increasing revenues,
cutting costs, and selling assets.

Studies have also

labeled these attempts to gain efficiency as operating
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turnarounds (Hofer, 1980), "stopping the bleeding"
(Bibeault, 1982), cutback strategies (Arogyasvamy, 1992;
O'Neill, 1986), and retrenchment (Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Strategic responses have focused on changing a firm's
competitive strategy within the same domain or moving into
new domains (Hofer, 1980).

Investigations have also labeled

these as growth strategies (O'Neill, 1986), rejuvenation
strategies (Arogyaswamy, 1992), and recovery strategies
(Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
Third, ambiguous results may exist because previous
studies have employed broad or vague strategy
classifications that obscure turnaround processes.

For

example, Robbins and Pearce (1992) and Morrow and Busenitz
(1993)

classified both "cost-cutting measures" and "selling

divisions" as retrenchment strategies.

These actions,

however, may require different management talents and have
different performance results.

Consequently, they should be

considered separately.
Thus, despite accumulating research, questions still
remain regarding the efficacy of different turnaround
strategies.

To answer these questions, an improved strategy

classification scheme needs to be developed that
incorporates previous research and recognizes specific
implementable strategies.
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TMG Characteristics
A firm's top-management group can also affect
alignment.

A TMG scans its firm's environment, interprets

information, and, based on this information, makes strategic
decisions that affect alignment (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972;
Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).

Because TMGs

have different talents, motives, and interpretations of
organizational and environmental stimuli, they can play a
critical role in reestablishing alignment and turning around
a firm.

The importance of different TMG characteristics has

been suggested in case studies of successful turnarounds
(e.g., Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Zimmerman, 1989), but has
yet to be empirically investigated (D'Aveni, 1989; O'Neill,
Bedard, Hussein, & Gutharaji, 1990).
Turnaround research has been primarily limited to
describing managerial characteristics purportedly needed in
turnaround situations (e.g., a "take charge" orientation and
good financial skills; Gerstein & Reisman, 1983), or more
often to the sweeping conclusion that performance slippage
signals the need for a new TMG (Hofer, 1980; Bibeualt,
1982).

This last argument also receives support in the

strategic management (Chandler, 1962; Miles & Snow, 1978)
and organizational change literatures (Helmich & Brown,
1972; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Virany, Tushman, &
Romanelli, 1992), which argue that as a TMG's average
company tenure increases, it falls victim to inertia and
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loses its ability to adapt to a changing environment.
Consequently, according to these literatures, replacing a
long-tenured TMG, particularly with outside managers,
represents the most effective way of changing a firm's
strategic direction and, ultimately, reversing declining
performance.
Research into the performance effect of replacing TMGs
in decline situations (with its primary focus on CEOs),
however, has yielded equivocal results (Furtado & Karan,
1990; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).

Many turnaround studies have

concluded that replacing incumbent TMGs represents a
necessary first step in turning around a troubled firm.
example, Schendel et al.

For

(1976) found that 44 of 54 firms

that effected a turnaround made management changes, and 39
firms changed general managers including their CEOs.

These

results are supported by other studies that have also found
high management turnover in turnaround firms (Bibeault,
1982; O'Neill, 1986; Slatter, 1984).

These studies contend

that sweeping changes may be necessary because faulty
decisions by an incumbent TMG can contribute to a prevailing
crisis, and, consequently, new management is needed to
revive a firm (Hofer, 1980).
Contrary results, however, also exist.

For example,

Zimmerman (1989) found that successful turnaround firms
retained their current TMGs.

He found that these firms were

led by long-tenured managers with extensive experience
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within each firm's industry.

Others have found that

replacing TMG members, especially CEOs, has little effect on
turning around declining performance (Barker, 1992;
Stanwick, 1992).
The role of TMGs in turnaround may be ambiguous because
extant studies have focused on retaining or replacing a TMG
instead of focusing on how well a TMG's talents match a
firm's strategic needs (Castrogiovanni, Baliga, & Kidwell,
1992) .

A growing body of research has shown, however, that

the interaction between TMG talents and a firm's strategy
can affect performance (Gupta, 1988; Hambrick, 1987; Thomas
et al., 1991).

Specifically, to the extent that a firm has

a TMG with appropriate talents to implement a particular
strategy, its performance will increase (Michel & Hambrick,
1992) .
TMG-Strateov Interaction
To study TMG-strategy interaction, studies have
investigated both business- (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984;
Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Virany & Tushman, 1986;
Govindarajan, 1989; Thomas et al., 1991) and corporate-level
strategies (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).

In terms of business-

level strategies (i.e., those strategic decisions involving
how a firm will compete within its current domain) , research
has found that different TMG talents were associated with
increased performance for firms implementing an efficiency
rather than an innovation strategy.

For an efficiency
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strategy, TMG backgrounds in production were associated with
higher performance (Govindarajan, 1989).

For an innovation

strategy, TMG backgrounds in marketing and sales were
associated with higher performance (Gupta & Govindarajan,
1984; Thomas et al., 1991).

In addition, firms having TMGs

with talents that did not match their strategies (e.g.,
marketing backgrounds with an efficiency strategy), suffered
decreased performance (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).
In terms of corporate-level strategies (i.e., those
strategic decisions affecting the choice of domains in which
a firm will compete), research has found that different TMG
talents are associated with increased performance for firms
implementing different types of growth strategies.

For

example, Michel and Hambrick (1992) posited that different
diversification strategies require different levels of
integration among a firm's business units, and,
consequently, ideal TMG talents will vary based on a firm's
strategy.

They found that increased fit between TMG

characteristics and a firm's strategy was associated with
higher performance.
Despite these findings, the performance effects of TMGstrategy interaction have not yet been empirically
investigated in terms of turnaround strategies.

Findings

from studies of declining firms, however, suggest that TMG
characteristics may also have an important effect on the
success of a firm's turnaround effort.

For example, some
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bankruptcy studies have found that deficiencies in TMG
talents may contribute to performance decline (D'Aveni,
1989; D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) .
Previous findings also suggest that TMG characteristics,
such as experience in different industries (Dumaine, 1990)
and TMG stock ownership (Pant, 1986), may also affect
turnaround.
In terms of TMG-strategy interaction, a TMG's talents
may aid a firm's turnaround following decline depending on a
firm's strategy.

For example, Hofer (1980) contended that

"a strategist/entrepreneur should be chosen if a highgrowth, strategic turnaround is to be pursued, whereas a
hard-nosed, experienced cost-cutter would be more
appropriate if an operating turnaround with a major cost
reduction effort is to be pursued"

(p. 26).

On the other

hand, lack of TMG-strategy alignment may prevent firms from
pulling out of decline (e.g., Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992;
Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).

Empirical findings showing that

firms following similar turnaround strategies enjoy
different degrees of success (e.g., Schendel & Patton, 1976)
further suggest the meaningful effect that a TMG may have on
a firm's turnaround efforts (Ford, 1985).
Thus, previous research suggests that TMG-strategy
interaction is important for improving a firm's performance.
Additionally, although limited empirical research has
focused on a TMG's role in turnaround, findings suggest that
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TMG-strategy interaction may help a firm regain alignment
and turn around performance.
Environment
The impact of environmental factors on firms is well
established in the organizational literature (Andrews, 1971;
Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980), yet few turnaround studies
have specifically included such factors in empirical
investigations.

Studies have noted that environmental

factors may contribute to a firm's decline (e.g., Bibeault,
1982; Schendel et a l . , 1976), but only a few have
empirically investigated the effect environmental factors
may have on performance (Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Pant,
1986; Ramanujam, 1984; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

Even

studies investigating environmental factors have examined a
fairly limited number of general environmental
characteristics, such as industry growth rate (Pant, 1986;
Ramanujam, 1984) or industry life-cycle stage (Morrow &
Busenitz, 1993).
In terms of general environmental factors that might
impact performance, Schendel et al (1976) noted declining
industry demand as a source of declining performance, and
Bibeault (1982) found that 16 percent of the 81 CEOs he
surveyed said their firms turned around because of recovery
in the business cycle.

Other researchers have also noted

the positive relationship between industry growth and
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successful turnaround (Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Pant, 1984;
Ramanujam, 1984; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Thus, although some turnaround studies have
investigated the role of environmental factors on
turnaround, research remains limited.

Given the important

role that environmental factors can have on performance,
this limited research into such factors represents a serious
deficiency in turnaround research.

Environmental factors,

thus, need to be specifically considered to investigate how
firms reestablish alignment and, subsequently, turn around.
Performance
A final issue involves the definition of performance
(the focal dependent variable).

Empirical turnaround

studies have focused primarily on profitability measures to
gauge decline and turnaround, but studies have varied in
their temporal definitions of decline and recovery phases
and in their selection of profitability measures to gauge
performance decline and turnaround.

Additionally, few

studies have justified the use of their performance measures
or set performance benchmarks for determining decline and
turnaround (Winn, 1993).

Consequently, conceptual

development of performance in the context of turnaround has
been limited (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
In terms of defining performance, previous studies have
often labeled firms with declining profitability or net
income as turnaround candidates.

Firms that regained

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
profitability or increased net income, therefore, have been
deemed successful turnaround firms.

Even in terms of

financial measures, however, disagreement exists regarding
an appropriate tturnaround definition (Barker & Mone, 1994;
Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Winn, 1993).
Some studies have used change in financial performance
relative to historical levels to define decline and
turnaround.

For example, Schendel et al.

(1976) used four

years of uninterrupted decline followed by four years of
increasing net income to select firms that had experienced
decline and had turned around.

Other studies (Melin, 1985;

Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Zimmerman, 1986) have defined
decline as decreasing profitability from historical levels
and turnaround as regaining some historical level of
profitability.
Problems can arise in terms of defining decline
relative to historical levels, however, because without an
absolute measure, firms experiencing changes in performance
relative to historical levels may be incorrectly classified
as declining or turning around (Barker & Mone, 1994;
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).

For example, a firm earning a

30 percent ROI that declines to 25 percent over a few years
could be defined as declining even though the firm may still
be performing well.

Conversely, a firm earning -30 percent

ROI that recovers to -25 percent ROI could be labeled as
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having turned around using only relative performance
measures.
Other studies have defined decline and turnaround
relative to industry performance.
(1981)

For example, O'Neill

defined banks that had net-income growth lower than

the industry average and then higher than the industry
average for three consecutive years as having declined and
turned around, respectively. Additionally, Pant (1986)
defined firms having ROA in the bottom 25 percent of an
industry as requiring turnaround and those that had reached
the upper 25 percent of an industry in years 7 and 8 as
successful turnarounds.

Other research (e.g., Pearce &

Robbins, 1993) has argued for the importance of defining
decline and turnaround relative to a specific industry.
A problem may also arise from using performance
relative to a specific industry because a firm may be
underperforming its industry, but if it competes in a high
growth industry, it could still be performing well (Pant,
1986) .

In addition, because turnaround research focuses on

firms that have experienced decline severe enough to
potentially threaten their survival, firms that are simply
underperforming their industries may be inappropriate for a
turnaround sample (Grinyer, Mayes,

& McKiernan, 1988; Winn,

1993) .
Another group of turnaround studies has used
performance minimums to define decline and turnaround.
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example, Hambrick and Schecter (1983) defined firms that
experienced ROI less than 10 percent as being in decline and
those that recovered to more them 20 percent as successful
turnaround firms.

Ramanujam (1984) defined firms similarly

setting ROI at 5 percent.

Although determining an absolute

anchor could be problematic given different average
profitability across industries (cf. Dess, Ireland, & Hitt,
1990), setting one overcomes many of the problems from
measuring performance relative to historical levels or
average industry levels (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).
Further, performance minimums derived from the economics and
finance literatures exist that translate across industries.
Drawing from the economics literature, Barker and Mone
(1994)

argued that firms that do not achieve break-even

profitability are not covering long-run production costs and
can be considered declining.

Drawing from the finance

literature, Barker (1992) defined firms that had
profitability below the risk-free rate of return as
declining because firms that cannot obtain at least the
risk-free rate will lose investors who can gain better
returns simply by investing in risk-free financial
instruments (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills).
Besides employing different financial measures, few
studies have conceptually justified their performance
measures (Winn, 1993) , and many have defined performance
narrowly in terms of profitability ratios (cf. Steers, 1975;
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Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).

Profitability measures

(e.g., ROI) serve as key measures of performance, but they
need to be complemented by other measures to comprehensively
gauge performance (Chakravarthy, 1986; Woo & Willard, 1983).
For example, Chakravarthy (1986) employed a firm's
debt/equity ratio as a performance measure because it
reflects a firm's ability to secure additional funds and
adapt.
Furthermore, relying solely on profitability measures
to gauge performance presents problems both for strategic
research in general and turnaround studies in particular.
First, strategic management research focuses on fitting
firms to their environments and maintaining this fit over
time (Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980).
Profitability measures adopt an historical perspective
whereas strategic management research focuses on future
adaptability.

In addition, these measures emphasize

stockholder interests over that of other stakeholders
(Chakravarthy, 1986) .
In regards to turnaround research, because TMGs in
declining firms may attempt to mask problems by resorting to
"creative accounting" (Argenti, 1976; Krueger & Willard,
1990), turnaround results based on profitability may be
suspect for two reasons.

First, if TMGs can maintain

profitability through actions such as manipulating inventory
valuation or depreciation rates, then firms that should be
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identified as declining may not be if studies rely solely on
profitability.

Second, even if studies do identify a

declining firm, the ability of a firm's TMG to manipulate
profitability may result in researchers incorrectly
identifying a firm as a turnaround when in fact its TMG has
simply manipulated accounting practices.

Hence, findings in

either instance would be misleading.3
Summary
This literature review has discussed the importance of
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment in
reestablishing a firm's alignment and turning around
declining performance.

In doing so, it has highlighted

equivocal performance results related to different
turnaround strategies and problems in previous turnaround
strategy operationalizations that may contribute to this
ambiguity.

Additionally,

it has noted the limited empirical

attention given to TMG and environmental factors as well as
the limited conceptual development of performance in the
context of turnaround.

These shortcomings are addressed in

the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY DEVELOPMENT
This dissertation contends that the equivocal results
of previous turnaround studies are a consequence of the
incomplete consideration of important components affecting a
declining firm's alignment.

In doing so, it maintains that

strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment, as well as
the interaction among these components, may have important
effects on reestablishing a firm's alignment and turning
around performance.

Thus, to develop a complete view of the

turnaround process, each of these components must be
considered.
To examine these components, the dissertation first
adapts a general strategy classification developed by Miles
(1982), Ford (1985), and Zammuto and Cameron (1985) for use
in classifying turnaround strategies.

This adapted

classification overcomes problems detailed earlier related
to classification schemes used in prior turnaround studies.
The dissertation then develops hypotheses pertaining to the
performance effects of turnaround strategy, TMG-strategy
interaction, and environmental characteristics.
Hypotheses
Strategy
A firm's strategy is defined as the combination of its
present and planned resource deployments, as well as its
environmental interactions (Ansoff, 1965; Hofer & Schendel,
1978).

Strategies, thus, can be defined both in terms of
44
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resource allocations to critical functions (e.g., R&D
investments) and the scope of a firm's interactions with its
environment (e.g., number of both products offered and
industries served).

This definition can be used to develop

a scheme for turnaround strategies that overcomes problems
with previous classifications.
The dissertation adapts a general strategy
classification scheme proposed in previous studies of
organizational decline (Miles, 1982; Ford,
Cameron, 1985).

1985; Zammuto &

According to this classification,

firms can

implement internal or external response strategies to
increase alignment.

An internal response strategy includes

cost-cutting and asset reduction programs to gain efficiency
(Ford, 1985).

This strategy focuses on changing resource

deployments by cutting expenses/investments (e.g., marketing
or R&D) or selling inefficient assets (e.g., obsolete
production plants).

This strategy is called an "efficiency"

turnaround strategy in the present framework, and partially
subsumes retrenchment strategies investigated in previous
research (e.g., Arogyaswamy, 1992; Kofer,

1980; O'Neill,

1986; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
By contrast, external response strategies include
increasing efforts within a firm's present domains or
supplementing efforts in current domains with new domains
(Ford, 1985; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).

These responses can

focus primarily on changing a firm's resource deployments or
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the scope of a firm's interactions with its environment.
Accordingly, firms can increase efforts within their present
domains.

Such efforts focus on changing resource

deployments by increasing expenses in areas such as
marketing in an attempt to increase sales (Zammuto &
Cameron, 1985).

This is called a "domain-offense" strategy

in the present framework, and it subsumes innovation
strategies investigated in previous research (e.g., Hambrick
& Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; O'Neill,

1986).

Firms can also alter the scope of their interactions
with their environments.

Firms can increase their scopes by

diversifying into new market niches to reduce dependence on
a shrinking industry (Miles, 1982) or to transfer skills to
new industries (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).

This strategy is

called a "domain-creation" strategy in the present
framework, and it subsumes growth strategies investigated in
previous research (e.g., Schendel et al., 1976; Zimmerman,
1989).
Alternatively, firms can shrink their scopes by
divesting unprofitable products or divisions and refocusing
on fewer core activities (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).

This

strategy is called a "domain-consolidation" strategy in the
present framework, and it subsumes the remaining
retrenchment strategies (i.e., those not subsumed by an
efficiency strategy) investigated in previous research
(Hofer, 1980; Melin, 1985; Morrow & Busenitz,

1993; O'Neill,
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1986).

Table 3.1 reviews general strategy classifications

and measures from previous turnaround studies in terms of
this adapted classification scheme.4
Although turnaround studies have classified strategies
as nominal variables (e.g., Robbins & Pearce, 1992; see also
Venkatraman & Grant, 1986), the turnaround strategies
discussed in the dissertation are generally consistent with
a continuum of strategies (cf. Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).
At one end of the continuum, a domain-consolidation strategy
involves divestment of business lines, whereas at the other
end, a domain-creation strategy involves adding new business
lines.

Thus, the continuum reflects possible strategy

options from "divest" to "build" (Gupta & Govindarajan,
1984).

The midpoint on the continuum is labeled a "status-

quo" strategy.

This strategy of not making any major

adjustments has been implemented successfully by some firms
as they simply "wait out the storm"

(such as a business

cycle downturn; see Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Bibeault, 1982;
O'Neill, 1986).

Figure 3.1 illustrates this turnaround

strategy continuum and positions previous studies in terms
of this classification scheme.
This turnaround strategy framework should overcome
three problems in previous classifications.

First, as

illustrated in Figure 3.1, it permits the dissertation to
investigate the entire spectrum of possible turnaround
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Table 3.1— Review of previous studies
in terms of the adapted classification scheme
Study

Concept Label

Measures Used or
Suggested_______

Efficiency Strategy
Schendel, Patton,
& Riggs, 1976

Operating
Responses

Hofer, 1980

Operating
Strategies
- Decreased costs

Increased P&E

Reduced costs
Reduced assets

- Decreased assets
- Combination
Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983

Asset and Cost
Surgery

Increased employee
productivity
Increased capacity
utilization
Reduced P&E
newness
Reduced R&D
Reduced marketing
Reduced
receivables
Reduced inventory

Robbins & Pearce,
1992

Cost Retrenchment

Reduced SGA
Reduced interest
Reduced misc.

Asset Retrenchment

Reduced cash and
equivalent
Reduced
receivables
Reduced inventory
Reduced P&E

Morrow &
Busenitz, 1993

Retrenchment

Reduced SGA
Reduced interest
Reduced total
assets

Barker & Duhaime,
1994

Strategic Change

Reduced production
costs
Reduced R&D
Reduced capital
expenditures
(table con'd)
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Domain Offense
Hofer, 1980

Operating turnaround
- Increase revenues
Strategic Turnaround
- one-level
increases
in share position
- two-level
increases
in share position

Product
reintroductions
and Increased
advertising
Increased R&D
New product lines
Change in
distribution
Change in
production
systems

Melin, 1985

Market Penetration

Increased
marketing
Decreased prices

Barker & Duhaime,
1994

Strategic Change

Increased
distribution
Increased R&D
(table con'd)
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Domain Creation
Schendel,
Patton, &
Riggs, 1976

Strategic Response

Increased
diversification
Increased vertical
integration

Melin, 1985

Export, New Markets

Increased exports
Increased
divers i f ication

O'Neill, 1986

Growth Strategies

New products
New promotion
methods
Acquisitions

Barker &
Duhaime, 1994

Strategic Change

Acquisitions
outside historical
lines of business
Acquis itions
within historical
lines of business
Entering joint
ventures outside
historical lines
of business
Expanding
marketing efforts
to new customers
(table con'd)
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Domain Consolidation
5 chendel, Patton,
6 Riggs, 1976

Strategic Response

Reduced business
segments

Hofer, 1980

Segmentation or
Niche Strategy

Reduced assets
Reduced product
segments

Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983

Selective Product/
Market Pruning

Increased price
Increased
employee
productivity
Increased product
quality
Reduced marketing
Reduced
receivables
Reduced inventory
Reduced capacity
utilization

Melin, 1985

International
Niche

Increased R&D
Reduced product
segments
Reduced capacity

O'Neill,

Cutback Strategies

Reduced inventory
Divestment of
subsidiaries

Strategic Change

Divestment of
organizational
units
Reduced product
lines

1986

Barker & Duhaime,
1994
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Domain
Consolidation

Efficiency

Status Quo

Domain
Offense

Strategic
response
Segmentation or
Niche

Decreased
costs/
Decreased
assets

Revenue
increasing

Domain
Creation
Strategic
response

Schendel,
Patton, ft
Riggs, 1976

Strategic
turnaround

Hofer, 1980

Business cycle
turnaround
Selective
product/ market
pruning

Bibeault, 1982

Asset and cost
surgery

Cutback
strategy

Hambrick ft
Schecter, 1983
Growth
strategy

O'Neill, 1986
Robbins ft
Pearce, 1992

Cost
retrenchment
Asset
retrenchment
Retrenchment
Strategic change

Turnaround
Study

Morrow ft
Busenitz, 1993
Strategic change

Barker ft
Duhaime, 1994

Figure 3.1— A continuum of turnaround strategies
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domain creation).

Second, the framework is based on

previous investigations of how firms overcome environmental
misalignment (Miles, 1982; Ford, 1985; Zammuto & Cameron,
1985).

Third, the framework positions firms according to

specific instead of consolidated strategy classifications.
For example, employing this classification, a firm
implementing a retrenchment strategy can be classified as
implementing an efficiency strategy, which focuses primarily
on changing a firm's resource allocations, or a domainconsolidation strategy, which focuses primarily on the
changing the scope of a firm's interaction with its
environment.
Based on findings from previous turnaround studies,
these strategies would be expected to improve a firm's
performance.

Given the argument that firms must first

implement retrenchment strategies prior to implementing
innovation- or growth-oriented strategies (Morrow &
Busenitz, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994; Robbins & Pearce,
1992), the following general hypothesis is proposed:
HI:

Firms implementing retrenchment strategies
(i.e., an efficiency strategy or a domainconsolidation strategy)

following a

performance decline will outperform firms
implementing a domain-offense or a domaincreation strategy.
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TMG Characteristics
TMG decision making can have a significant impact on a
firm's alignment, and, thus, its performance (Andrews, 1971;
Child, 1972).

Because managers remain limited by bounded

rationality and multiple, conflicting goals when making
complex strategic decisions (Cyert & March, 1963; March &
Simon, 1958), they will (by necessity) make decisions based
on their world views.

These views, in turn, can be affected

by functional background and other career experiences, such
as employment in multiple companies or industries (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984).

Additionally, because managers do not

generally make strategic decisions in isolation, but as
members of a TMG, TMG characteristics may provide insights
into decision-making processes.
Different TMG characteristics can interact with
situational variables to affect a firm's performance.

These

variables include strategies implemented by firms (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984).

A growing body of research suggests that

aligning TMG skills with particular strategies may improve a
firm's performance (Gupta, 1988; Hambrick, 1987).

This

research has focused on business- and corporate-level
strategies, but has yet to investigate turnaround
strategies.
A review of previous research suggests that three TMG
demographic characteristics (viz., functional background,
company experience, and industry experience) are related to
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a TMG's ability to implement a turnaround strategy.

These

characteristics can affect how TMGs make decisions,
particularly in terms of how they identify problems and
formulate their world views (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Gupta &
Govindarajan, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miles & Snow,
1978; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).

Additionally, case studies

of turnaround (e.g., Duhaime, 1990; Hofer, 1980) have
suggested that all three characteristics affect a TMG's
ability to implement turnaround strategies.5
To further investigate the effects of these
characteristics, the dissertation employs a TMG careerorientation typology developed by White, Smith, and Barnett
(1994).

This typology accounts for important differences

among TMGs in terms of functional background, company
experience, and industry experience.6

The following career

specializations are defined in this typology:
Core:

Top managers who have a functional

specialization in production or sales with a single
company or production within a single industry.
Administrative:

Top managers who have a functional

specialization in general management, finance, or law
within a single company or industry, as well as those
who have a functional specialization in production or
sales in more than one industry.
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Environmental:

Top managers who have a functional

specialization in general management, finance, or law
in more than one industry.
TMG members can develop diverse talents from their
different functional, company, and industry backgrounds that
may be critical to effectively implementing varying
strategies

(Hitt, Ireland, & Palia, 1982; Miles & Snow,

1978; Snow & Hrebeniak, 1980).

For example, Govindarajan

(1989) found that TMGs with dominant backgrounds in core
functions (e.g., production) effectively implemented
efficiency strategies.

In addition, TMGs with dominant

backgrounds in administrative functions

(e.g., sales) have

been found to effectively implement domain-offense
strategies
1991).

(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Thomas et al.,

Moreover, TMGs with dominant backgrounds in

environmental functions (e.g., finance) have been found to
effectively implement different domain-creation strategies
(Graham & Richards,
1982).

1978; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Song,

Further, firms having TMGs with dominant backgrounds

that do not match their strategies have been found to suffer
decreased performance (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).
Extending these findings to turnaround strategies, the
following hypotheses are suggested:
H2a: Firms implementing a retrenchment (i.e., an
efficiency or domain-consolidation) strategy whose
TMGs have a core-function specialization will
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outperform those firms whose TMGs have
administrative- or environmental-function
specializations.
H2b: Firms implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMGs have an administrative-function
specialization will outperform those firms whose
TMGs have core- or environmental-function
specializations.
H2c: Firms implementing a domain-creation strategy
whose TMGs have an environmental-function
specialization will outperform those firms whose
TMGs have core- or administrative-function
specializations.
Other TMG characteristics may also affect
organizational outcomes.

One such characteristic, stock

ownership, has been hypothesized to impact TMG motives for
implementing particular strategies such as diversification.
Conflicting goals between a TMG and owners (e.g.,
stockholders)

in firms may lead a TMG to make decisions that

run counter to maximizing a firm's performance and, thus,
shareholder wealth.

Conversely, increasing TMG stock

ownership may serve to align TMG and owners' goals and
prompt a TMG to implement a strategy that increases a firm's
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
This suggests the following hypothesis:
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H2d: There will be a positive relation between TMG
stock ownership and performance in declining
firms.
In particular, TMGs may diversify to diffuse their
employment risk (e.g., job or reputation loss) rather than
to create owner/shareholder value (Amihud & Lev,

1981).

In

decline situations, the motivation for managers to reduce
employment risk may become even more pronounced.

Thus, a

TMG with low average stock ownership may select a
diversification (i.e., domain-creation) strategy in an
attempt to maintain job security when other strategies may
offer better routes to turnaround.

In contrast, a TMG with

high average stock ownership may select a domain-creation
strategy because TMG members believe doing so will create
shareholder value.

Therefore, whereas stock ownership is

hypothesized to be positively related to a firm's
performance across all turnaround strategies (H2d), this
positive relation may be stronger in firms implementing a
domain-creation strategy because it offers TMGs the highest
degree of employment risk diffusion.

This difference in TMG

motives may help explain conflicting findings in turnaround
research showing that a diversification strategy can improve
(Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Schendel et al., 1976) or decrease
(Zimmerman, 1989) a firm's performance.

This suggests the

following hypothesis:
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H2e: There will be a stronger positive relation
between stock ownership and performance for
declining firms implementing a domaincreation strategy than for firms implementing
either a domain-offense or retrenchment
strategy.
Environment
Environments can be studied along several dimensions
(Aldrich, 1979), each of which may have a different impact
on a firm's performance (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Porter,

1980).

Consequently, to examine the impact a firm's environment can
have on turnaround, a multidimensional operationalization of
environment should be employed.

Dess and Beard (1984)

presented a parsimonious environmental classification scheme
that defines environments along three dimensions;
munificence, dynamism, and complexity.

Munificence is the

extent of resource availability in an environment and its
capacity to support growth (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats &
Hitt, 1988; for a review, see also Castrogiovanni, 1991).
Dynamism is the degree to which an environment exhibits
instability.

Complexity is the heterogeneity of elements

(e.g., competitors, suppliers, buyers) within a firm's
environment (Child, 1972).

Each of these dimensions are

expected to affect a firm's turnaround.
Environmental munificence should be positively related
to turnaround.

A growing industry provides increased
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opportunities for firms to find new customers and can reduce
the level of competitive intensity within an industry
(Hofer, 1975; Porter, 1980).

Consequently, firms

experiencing performance decline in growing industries
should turn around more often than declining firms in
stagnant industries or industries experiencing shrinking
resource pools (Ramanujam, 1984).

Alternatively, declines

in environmental munificence may prevent firms from turning
around and can ultimately cause declining firms to fail
(D'Aveni, 1989; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988).

The following

hypothesis is, therefore, suggested:
H3a: Environmental munificence will be positively
related to performance in declining firms.
Environmental dynamism should be negatively related to
turnaround.

As instability increases, a firm's decision

making routines, established to promote efficient adaptation
to environmental shocks, may retard adjustment to new
environmental demands (Cyert & March, 1963) .

Thus, a firm

maintaining current routines faces increased difficulty
learning quickly enough about its environment to
successfully adapt (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) .
a firm may attempt to develop new routines.

Alternatively,
In doing so,

however, it must sacrifice efficiency (Nelson & Winter,
1982) and expend slack resources at a time when such
resources may be depleted from decline (Pearce & Robbins,
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1993; Ramanujam, 1984).

The following hypothesis is,

therefore, suggested;
H3b: Environmental dynamism will be negatively related
to performance in declining firms.
Environmental complexity should also be negatively
related to turnaround.

Increasing complexity increases a

TMG's information processing requirements (Dess & Beard,
1984).

When faced with a crisis such as performance

decline, however, a TMG may experience threat-rigidity in
its decision making (Staw et al., 1981).

Consequently, the

maladaptive effects of threat rigidity may be compounded in
environments characterized by increasing complexity.
Such complexity may occur as a result of numerous
factors.

One factor defining an industry's complexity is

the number of firms competing within the industry (Keats &
Hitt, 1988).

As the number of firms increases, the

potential for intense competition also increases (Porter,
1980).

As a result, declining firms may face a more hostile

competitive environment in which to attempt a turnaround as
environmental complexity increases.

In contrast, as the

number of firms decreases, interdependence among firms
increases allowing for more managed, benign competition
(Pfeffer & Nowak,

1976). The following hypothesis is,

therefore, suggested:
H3c: Environmental complexity will be negatively
related to performance in declining firms.
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Integration
The above hypotheses will investigate the effects of
strategy, TMG-strategy interaction, and environment on
turnaround.

To provide a comprehensive view of the

turnaround process, this dissertation also studies the
effects of these variables as a group.
Hypothesis 3a posits that environmental munificence has
a positive relation with turnaround.

Not all firms

operating in increasingly munificent environments, however,
turn around (D'Aveni,

1989; Moulton & Thomas, 1988).

This

inability to reverse declining performance may result from
TMGs with inadequate talents making suboptimal decisions
that hinder firms from recovering (Hambrick & D'Aveni,
1992).

Thus, to the extent that TMG talents deviate from

the profiles posited in Hypotheses 2a through 2c, TMGs may
face increasing difficulties in properly implementing
turnaround strategies (cf. Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Thomas
et al, 1991).

These difficulties, in turn, may compound

performance problems for firms operating in decreasingly
munificent environments.

In contrast, a match between TMG

talents and turnaround strategy should increase the positive
relation between environmental munificence and turnaround.
The following hypotheses are, therefore, suggested:
H4a: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
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TMGs have a core-function specialization than
for firms whose TMGs have either an
administrative- or environmental-function
specialization.
H4b: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMGs have an administrative-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either an core- or environmental-function
specialization.
H4c: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose
TMGs have an environmental-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either a core- or administrative-function
specialization.
Hypothesis 3b and 3c posit that environmental dynamism
and complexity will both have a negative relation with
turnaround.

To the extent that TMG talents deviate from the

profiles posited in Hypotheses 2a-2c, these negative
relations should increase as TMGs encounter increased
difficulty in properly implementing turnaround strategies.
These difficulties, in turn, may compound performance
problems for firms operating in increasingly dynamic or
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complex environments.

In contrast, a match between TMG

talents and turnaround strategy should decrease these
negative relations. The following hypotheses are, therefore,
suggested:
H5a: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
TMGs have a core-function specialization than
for firms whose TMGs have either an
administrative- or environmental-function
specialization.
H5b: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMGs have an administrative-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either an core- or environmental-function
specialization.
H5c: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose
TMGs have an environmental-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either a core- or administrative-function
specialization.
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H6a: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
TMGs have a core-function specialization than
for firms whose TMGs have either an
administrative- or environmental-function
specialization.
H6b: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMGs have an administrative-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either an core- or environmental-function
specialization.
H6c: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose
TMGs have an environmental-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either a core- or administrative-function
specialization.
Summary
This chapter derived hypotheses investigating the
effect that turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and
environment have on reestablishing a firm's alignment and
turning around its performance.

To examine the effect of
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turnaround strategy, a general strategy classification was
adapted for classifying turnaround strategies.

How this

adapted classification scheme overcomes problems related to
classification schemes in prior turnaround studies is
detailed.

Hypotheses pertaining to the performance effects

of TMG-strategy interaction and environmental
characteristics, as well as the combined performance effects
of strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental
characteristics were then developed.

The next chapter

presents the methods for testing these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
This chapter describes methodological issues related to
testing hypotheses developed in Chapter 3.

First, the

chapter discusses the sample and data sources employed.
Second, it describes issues related to employing slack as
measure of performance.

Third, it presents measures of

strategy, TMG characteristics, environmental dimensions, and
performance.

Finally, it details methods employed for

testing each hypothesis.
Sample
The turnaround sample used for the dissertation was
drawn from Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT Industrial Tapes, a
data base that reports financial information for over 6,000
large, public U.S. corporations.

The data base was searched

for manufacturing firms experiencing performance declines
that pose potential threats to their long-term viability
(defined below) to meet the definition of decline previously
presented.
The COMPUSTAT data base was employed because it
provides detailed financial information necessary to select
a turnaround sample large enough for statistical analysis,
and provides data necessary to operationalize strategy,
environment and performance measures.

Additionally, several

previous turnaround studies have employed COMPUSTAT (e.g.,
Barker, 1992? Barker & Mone, 1994; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993;
Pant, 1986? Ramanujam, 1984) thus permitting comparative
67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
analyses.

To reduce concerns about error rates in COMPUSTAT

(Rosenberg & Houglet, 1974), data were collected for a
random sample of firms from both COMPUSTAT and Moody's
Industrial Reports.

Information from these two sources was

compared to assess data integrity.

The Pearson correlation

coefficient between data was .999 (e <.0001).

Thus, concerns

about error rates in the data base appear alleviated.
The target sample drawn from COMPUSTAT covered a time
period sufficient to assess turnaround.

Previous turnaround

studies have often employed periods of two to four years to
ensure that a performance decline is not just a short-term
downturn.

Upturn cycles have been operationalized as two-

to four-year periods to verify that a firm has indeed turned
around (Krueger & Willard, 1991; Robbins & Pearce, 1992;
Schendel et al., 1976).

Allowing at least two years for

firms to implement turnaround strategies (Bibeault, 1982)
means that target firms had to be examined for a minimum of
six years.

Given that firms may decline for more than two

years and may need more than two years to recover (Winn,
1993), turnaround situations were examined for up to ten
years.

This timeframe is consistent with recent empirical

turnaround research (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Robbins &
Pearce, 1992).

Moreover, in contrast to studies that have

fixed time periods for decline, recovery, and turnaround
(e.g., Pant, 1986), tracking firms for up to ten years
permitted the investigation of firms that may have required
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different lengths of time to recover (Robbins & Pearce,
1SS2).
To select a turnaround sample, COMPUSTAT was searched
for firms that have suffered decline.

To overcome

measurement and theoretical shortcomings in turnaround
research (see Chapter 2) resulting from exclusive reliance
on profitability measures, the dissertation examined decline
and turnaround in terms of organizational slack (Bourgeois,
1981; Chakravarthy, 1986; Cyert & March, 1963).
Organizational slack represents a cushion of actual or
potential resources that allows firms to adapt to internal
or external pressures for change (Bourgeois, 1981: 30).
Organizational slack thus provides a theoretically based
method for measuring decline and, when used to complement
profitability ratios, should make the study of turnaround
less susceptible to spurious findings.
Organizational slack may also represent a useful
turnaround measure because it overcomes many of the problems
noted above as being associated with relying solely on
profitability measures by providing a measure of future
adaptability.

Further, because decline is a "condition in

which a substantial, absolute decrease in an organization's
resource base occurs over a specified period of time"
(Cameron, Kim, & Whetton, 1987: 224), slack represents a
measure for determining decline and turnaround that
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corresponds with theoretical arguments in the decline
literature.
Cyert and March (1963) first defined slack as the
difference between resources available to a firm and
payments required to keep stakeholder support.

Cohen,

March, and Olsen (1972) later modified this definition to
represent the difference between a firm's resources and the
combination of demands made on the firm.

Organizational

slack thus represents a cushion of actual or potential
resources that allows firms to adapt to internal or external
pressures for change and, thereby, initiate changes in
strategy (Bourgeois, 1981: 30).
Slack resources exist as a margin of error within firms
and, therefore, remain essential to smooth functioning
(Scott, 1987).7

Slack also allows for adaptation to

unanticipated future events by providing a cushion to absorb
environmental variability.

Additionally, it provides a

buffer to safeguard resources needed for product innovation
(Thompson, 1967) .

Thus, slack plays both stabilizing and

adaptive roles (Cyert & March, 1963: 38).
allows firms to weather downturns

Slack likewise

(Ford, 1985).

Consequently, slack should provide a useful means for
assessing a firm's ability to survive in a changing
environment.

As slack diminishes, a firm's ability to adapt

declines, and failure to adapt can lead to death (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984).
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Despite its theoretical importance, only a few studies
have used slack as a performance measure.

One such study,

Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988), found that firms that
ultimately declared bankruptcy had significantly higher debt
levels (i.e., lower potential slack) and lower profitability
compared to a matched sample of healthy firms.

Declining

slack, therefore, may provide advanced warning of difficult
times.

Additionally, Barker (1992) and Barker and Duhaime

(1994) are the only turnaround studies that employ a measure
of slack, but both included slack as an independent rather
than as a dependent variable.
Pragmatically, slack may represent a useful complement
to profitability for measuring decline and turnaround for
two reasons.

First, TMGs often react to diminishing slack.

Bibeault (1982) found that key warning signals used by TMGs
included measures of slack such as increasing debt.

Second,

slack can be operationalized using publicly available
financial data (Bourgeois,

1981), so researchers have ready

access to data and can replicate findings.
To select a sample of declining firms from COMPUSTAT,
the following criteria were employed:
1.

At least three years of profitability below the
risk-free rate of return

2.

At least three years of decreasing slack defined
as decreasing available slack with a non-positive
change in potential slack or
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decreasing potential slack with a non-positive
change in available slack
These criteria reflect the definition of decline
previously presented.

Profitability below the risk-free

rate represents a situation where firms are earning an
inadequate return to attract investment (Barker, 1992).

In

the present dissertation, profitability is measured using
return on invested capital.

Risk free rate is measured

using the annual rate of return for 6-month U.S. Treasury
bills.
These criteria reflect the availability of different
types of slack (Bromiley, 1991).

The first type, available

slack, reflects a firm's uncommitted liquid resources
(Singh, 1986).

Available slack was measured as the ratio of

current assets (excluding inventory) to current liabilities
(i.e., the quick ratio; Kieso & Weygandt, 1986).

The second

type/ potential slack, reflects resources available from a
firm's external environment (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983).
Potential slack was measured using individual firm's
debt/equity ratio.8
Employing both profitability and slack measures offers
two advantages relative to past operationalizations of
decline.

First, along with profitability, both measures of

slack provide insights into potential financial problems
because increases in debt and decreases in liquidity portend
increasing bankruptcy risks.

Thus, firms meeting these
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criteria face potential threats to their long-term
viability,

second, although these slack measures are

accounting-based, they make decline operationalizations less
susceptible to the financial manipulation problems noted
earlier.

Specifically, values of current assets (i.e.,

cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable) and
debt are more objective and, thus, less subject to
manipulation than profitability measures.
The beginning of a firm's turnaround was measured as
the year following its steepest drop in performance (i.e.,
its largest drop in profitability or slack).

The relevant

literature argues that pronounced drops in performance are
often necessary to prompt turnaround (Schendel et al.,
1976).

Thus, this measure coincides with recent

operationalizations of turnaround inception (Barker & Mone,
1994; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

This first year served as a

base period for measuring change in the variables used to
operationalize strategy.
Firms that recovered to a return on invested capital
(ROIC) above the risk-free rate for three years and
increased slack for three years within the timeframe of the
study were classified as turnaround firms.

Those that did

not regain predownturn levels of performance were classified
as "continuously declining" firms (D'Aveni, 1989).

An

initial survey of COMPUSTAT found that since 1974, 218 firms
met the definition of decline.

Firms that filed for
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bankruptcy or were acquired by other firms during their
turnaround attempts were removed from the sample because
strategic decisions in these firms could either made by
bankruptcy courts or corporate parents.

Additionally, firms

less than 10-years old were also removed to avoid any
potential confounds related to firms experiencing a
"liability of newness"

(Stinchcombe, 1965).

For example,

new firms may have low profitability and decreasing slack as
they attempt to establish themselves in an industry
(Dollinger, 1995).
manufacturers.

Finally, the sample was limited to U.S.

Complete data, including information on TMG

backgrounds, resulted in a final sampling frame of 129
firms.
Measures
Strategy Measures
To reflect a firm's resource allocations and scope
(Hofer & Schendel,

1978), turnaround strategy was

operationalized along three dimensions: costs. assets, and
strategic change.

Costs and assets measure resource

allocation decisions, and both dimensions were necessary to
measure a firm's turnaround strategy because each strategy
(except the theoretical midpoint,

"status quo") could

include changes in both these dimensions.

For example,

implementing an efficiency strategy often involves reducing
costs (e.g., marketing) and assets (e.g., number of
employees).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
Strategic change reflects changes in a firm's scope.
This dimension was necessary to measure a firm's turnaround
strategy because a strategy could include no change (e.g.,
domain offense) or a substantial change (e.g., domain
creation)

in this dimension.

Costs.

Resource allocation decisions related to costs

were operationalized as a firm's sales, general, and
administrative expense.9
Assets.

Resource allocation decisions related to

assets were operationalized as a firm's inventory, number of
employees, and plant and equipment.

All resource allocation

measures were taken from COMPUSTAT.
Strategic chance.

Firms can also change their scopes

while attempting a turnaround.

Strategic change measures

examined these actions in terms of divestments and
acquisitions.

Strategic change was operationalized

employing two measures, domain initiative and domain
reduction.

Domain initiative was measured as the number of

new 4-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes
added by a firm in each year following decline.

Domain

reduction was measured as the number of 4-digit SIC codes
dropped by a firm in each year following decline.

Data for

these measures were gathered from two sources, Dun &
Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory and Standard & Poor's
Register of Corporations. Directors, and Executives.
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Cost, asset, and strategic change variables were
operationalized as the percentage change from a base year.
These data were then analyzed using cluster analysis to
derive strategy clusters.10

Four major clusters

corresponding with the four turnaround strategies were
anticipated to provide the best data fit, although smaller
clusters were also possible because a firm could implement a
"status quo" or a combination strategy (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Hofer, 1980, Stanwick, 1992).
When clustering analyzing strategy variables and TMG
variables (discussed below), both hierarchical and
nonhierarchical methods were employed to overcome potential
problems associated with each method (Milligan, 1980).
First, the data were analyzed using Ward's method, which has
been found to outperform other hierarchical clustering
methods (Punj & Stewart,

1983).

Because hierarchical

methods generally suffer from problems such as poor initial
combinations persisting throughout an analysis (i.e., poor
early combinations of observations are not reassigned later
in an analysis), Ward's method was used only to establish
the number of clusters, derive cluster centers, and
eliminate outliers

(Hair, Anderson, Tatham,

& Black, 1992).

Second, after determining the number of clusters with
Ward's method (discussed below), a non-hierarchical
clustering method was employed.

Specifically, the FASTCLUS

procedure available in SAS was employed fSAS User's Guide;
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Statistics. 1985)

The cluster centroids from Ward's method

were used as seed points for the FASTCLUS procedure.
Employing FASTCLUS permits cluster assignments to be "finetuned" by allowing firms to switch cluster membership (Hair
et al., 1992).
A major issue in cluster analysis involves selection of
a stopping rule to determine an appropriate number of
clusters.

Two stopping rules, change in the pseudo t2

statistic and visual inspection of tree diagrams, were
employed (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; SAS Institute,
1985; Hair et al., 1992).

The pseudo t2 is closely related

to the Je(2)/Je(l) statistic (Duda & Hart, 1973) , which has
been shown to derive accurate estimates of the number of
clusters in a data set (Milligan & Cooper, 1985).

Visual

inspection of tree diagrams was used to support the findings
of the pseudo t2 statistic.
TMG Measures
TMG variables were chosen to reflect characteristics
posited to affect a TMG's ability to implement turnaround
strategies.

TMG measures were collected from Dun &

Bradsteet's Directory of Corporate Management. Standard &
Poor's Register of Corporations. Directors, and Executives.
Who's Who in Finance and Industry, as well as 10-K financial
reports and proxy statements for the following variables:
dominant functional background, company tenure,

industry
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tenure, industry experience, and percentage of stock
ownership.
This dissertation defined a TMG as managers holding
positions in the top two levels of firm's management
hierarchy (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993).

This definition

included the following top executive positions: Chairman,
CEO, President, and Chief Operating Officer (COO).

It also

included the most senior level of vice presidents in a
company, which consisted of the following positions:
Executive Vice President, Senior Vice President, or Vice
President.

This definition permitted classifying TMGs

across firms that had similar degrees of responsibility
within their respective firms because managers in the top
two levels were included even when the titles associated
with those levels varied across firms (Wiersema & Bantel,
1993) .
Percentage of stock ownership was measured as the
number of shares held by a TMG divided by total shares
outstanding.

This measure, therefore, does not include TMG

stock options for additional shares of stock.

Options were

excluded because estimating the value of options requires
crude guesses on such variables as future interest rates,
opportunity costs of holding stock options, and future stock
prices (Gomez-Mejia,

1994).
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Environmental Measures
Environmental measures were chosen to reflect
dimensions posited to affect turnaround.

Data were

collected from COMPUSTAT for the following variables:
munificence, dynamism, and complexity.

These variables were

measured at the three-digit level in COMPUSTAT (Keats &
Hitt, 1988).
Munificence was measured using average growth rates of
net sales, employment, and operating income in a firm's
primary industry (Dess & Beard, 1984).

These growth rates

were measured between a firm's decline and its turnaround
for successful turnaround firms or between a firm's decline
and the end of the focal timeframe for continuously
declining firms.

Keats and Hitt (1988)

adapted Dess and

Beard's (1984) environmental measures so that data could be
obtained from COMPUSTAT.

Following Keats and Hitt (1988),

each growth rate was measured as the antilog of the
regression slope coefficient from the following regression
equation:
y = bo + b,t + at
where
y

=

industry sales, employment, or operating
income

t

=

year

a

=

residual
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Dynamism was measured as the instability of growth
rates in net sales, employment, operating income in a firm's
primary industry (Dess & Beard, 1984).

This instability was

measured between a firm's decline and its turnaround for
successful turnaround firms or between a firm's decline and
the end of the focal timeframe for continuously declining
firms.

Following Keats and Hitt (1988), instability was

measured as the antilog of the standard error of each
regression slope coefficient from the above regression
equation.
Complexity was measured as the concentration ratio of a
firm's industry between a firm's decline and its turnaround
for successful turnaround firms or between a firm's decline
and the end of the study's timeframe for continuously
declining firms.

Concentration was measured as the

aggregated market share of the largest four firms in a
firm's primary industry.

Higher levels of this variable

indicate decreased complexity because large firms have more
control in an industry (Porter, 1980; Scherer,

1980).

All

measures were taken from COMPUSTAT.
Performance Measures
As noted, performance was measured in three ways.
First, a firm's profitability was measured using its return
on invested capital, which was computed as the ratio of a
firm's income before extraordinary items and interest
expense divided by the sum of common equity, preferred
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stock, minority interest, and long-term debt.

Second, a

firm's available slack was measured using its quick ratio,
which was computed as the sum of cash, marketable
securities, and accounts receivable divided by current
liabilities.

Third, potential slack was measured using a

firm's debt/equity ratio.
COMPUSTAT.

All measures were taken from

All three performance measures were calculated

as a percentage change from the base year.

Additionally, as

previously noted, profitability was also measured as a
percentage of the risk free rate, which provides an absolute
anchor for performance comparisons.
Because this dissertation is the first turnaround study
to employ slack as a dependent variable, it needed to assess
the construct validity of the proposed slack measures.
Construct validity was tested by assessing dimensionality,
as well as testing convergent and predictive validities
(Kerlinger, 1986; Venkatraman & Grant,

1986).

To assess dimensionality, performance and environmental
characteristics variables were factor analyzed.

Performance

variables were expected to load highly on two dimensions
corresponding to profitability and slack.

Additionally, two

environmental constructs (i.e., munificence and dynamism)
had multiple measures.

These measures were expected to load

highly on two dimensions corresponding to munificence and
dynamism.
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Construct validity was also assessed by testing
convergent and predictive validities (Venkatraman & Grant,
1986).

To check convergent validity, the proposed slack

measures were compared to other theoretical measures of
slack.

First, the quick ratio, which measures a firm's

liquid resources, was compared with a firm's retained
earnings, which provides another measure of available slack
(Bourgeois & Singh, 1983).

A positive correlation was

expected between these two measures.
Second, a firm's debt to equity ratio, which measures
resources available from the environment, was compared with
a firm's price/earnings ratio, which provides another
measure of potential slack (Bourgeois & Singh,

1983).

A

negative correlation was expected between these two
measures.

All measures were taken from COMPUSTAT and

Moody's Industrial Reports.
To assess predictive validity, the performance measures
were compared with measures of slack that reflect decline
outcomes.
rate.

One such measure is a firm's dividend payout

This measure gauges a firm's available slack

(Bourgeois, 1981), but because TMGs are often hesitant to
adjust dividend payout rates until financial conditions
decline dramatically, this measure may not change until
after a firm has already experienced decline.

Thus,

comparing a firm's quick ratio during decline with its
dividend payout rate after decline should serve as a measure
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of predictive validity.

To assess predictive validity, each

firm’s quick ratio was compared to its dividend payout
lagged one year to allow for this delay in adjusting a
dividend payout rate.

A positive correlation was expected

between these two measures.
Another slack measure which may change following
decline is a firm's credit rating.

Credit agencies (e.g.,

Standard & Poors and Moody's) may adjust a firm's rating,
but again, these changes may not occur until after a firm
experiences decline.

This measure gauges a firm's potential

slack (Bourgeois, 1981).

Thus, comparing a firm's

debt/equity ratio during decline with its credit rating
after decline should serve as a measure of predictive
validity.

To assess predictive validity, each firm's debt

to equity ratio was compared to its credit rating lagged one
year to allow time for credit agencies to adjust a firm's
rating.
expected.

A negative correlation between these measures was
These measures were taken from COMPUSTAT, Moody's

Industrial Reports and Moody's Bond Record.
Control Variables
Severity.

A firm's decline severity may also affect

its turnaround efforts.

In general, a firm facing a severe

decline in its operating health may have a more difficult
time recovering because it lacks the resources to implement
a turnaround effort (Barker, 1992; Ramanujam, 1984).
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To control for decline severity, Altman's (1988) Zscore was employed.

This measure, which has been used in

previous turnaround research (e.g., Barker, 1992; Stanwick,
1992), gauges the probability that a firm will declare
bankruptcy in the short term.11

A firm's Z-score is

defined as follows:
z. = 0.012X, + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.0065^ + 0.999Xg

where
X^ = working capital/total assets

X2 = retained earnings/total assets
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets
X4 = market value equity/book value of total
liabilities
Xg = sales/total assets
Z

= overall index

Firm Size.

The organizational literature suggests two

possible relationships between firm size and turnaround.
First, larger firms may have more resources to commit to
overcoming decline and, thus, may recover more quickly.
Alternatively, larger firms may fall victim to inertia and
not adjust in time to stave of decline (Morrow & Busenitz,
1993; Pant, 1986; Ramanujam, 1984).
firm's turnaround effort.

Thus, size may affect a

Finn size was operationalized as

a firm's average sales during the focal timeframe.
Market share.

The impact of market share on a firm's

turnaround effort has also been discussed in previous
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turnaround studies (Arogyaswamy et al., 1994; Hambrick &
Schecter,

1983, Hofer, 1980).

A firm with a high market

share that experiences decline may have more options than
one in a weak position.

This measure was operationalized as

a firm's average market share in its primary line of
business during the study's timeframe.12
Management Turnover.

Management turnover may also

affect a firm's turnaround efforts.

As noted, however, the

performance effect of management turnover in troubled
organizations remains ambiguous
Kesner & Sebora, 1994).

(Furtado & Karan, 1990;

This measure was operationalized as

the percentage of TMG members who remained with a firm from
the beginning of its decline until its turnaround for
successful turnaround firms or between the beginning of its
decline until the end of the focal timeframe for
continuously declining firms.
Analysis
Hypotheses 1, 2a through 2e, and 3a through 3c predict
that turnaround strategy, TMG-strategy interaction, and
environmental factors will each affect turnaround.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms whose TMGs implement
retrenchment strategies will outperform those that do not
retrench.

To test this hypothesis, firms were classified

according to their turnaround strategy.

Firms implementing

retrenchment strategies following decline were compared to
firms that did not retrench following decline.

An analysis
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of variance was performed comparing turnaround across the
three strategies (i.e., retrenchment, domain offense, domain
creation).
In studying the effects of strategy on turnaround, both
measures of performance (i.e., profitability and slack) were
examined because no theoretical basis can be offered to
predict which turnaround measure will be associated more
with a turnaround strategy.

Both measures of performance

were similarly employed in the remaining hypotheses.
Hypotheses 2a through 2c predict that interaction
between TMG characteristics and specific turnaround
strategies is positively associated with turnaround.

To

test these hypotheses, TMGs were classified according to
White et al.'s (1994) three career-orientation
specializations.

TMG data were collected for TMG members in

charge of a firm for at least two years prior to the firm's
turnaround for successful turnaround firms or for at least
two years prior to the last year of the focal timeframe for
continuously declining firms.
To determine TMG specialization, each TMG member was
classified as having either a core, administrative, or
environmental specialization based on his/her career
background.

Coding this information was relatively straight

forward (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).13

Next, the percentage

of TMG members falling into each classification was computed
for each firm.

Firms were then cluster analyzed following
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the two-step clustering process detailed above.

A three-

cluster solution was expected to best fit the data.
Hypothesis 2d predicts that TMG stock ownership is
significantly related to performance.
analyzed using multiple regression.

This hypothesis was
Separate equations were

run to measure the effect of independent variables on each
measure of performance as follows:
Performance =

Control Variables + Average Stock
Ownership

where
Performance

=

ROIC, Debt/Equity, or Quick ratio

=

Decline Severity, Firm Size, Market

Control
Variables

Share, Percentage of Management
Turnover
Average Stock
Ownership

=

Average TMG stock ownership
following a firm's decline

Hypothesis 2e predicts that because of different
possible motives (Eisenhardt, 1989), TMG stock ownership
will have a greater impact on the efficacy of a domaincreation strategy than on the other turnaround strategies.
This hypothesis was analyzed using subgroup analysis.

To

test this hypothesis, firms were classified according to
turnaround strategy implemented.

Then the correlation

between the percentage of TMG stock ownership and
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performance was determined for each strategy, and Fisher's
z.-test was employed to test for significant differences
across correlations.
Hypotheses 3a through 3c predict that environmental
factors will have a significant impact on performance.
These hypotheses were analyzed employing multiple
regression.

Separate equations were run to measure the

effect of independent variables on each measure of
performance as follows:
Performance =

Control Variables + Munificence +
Dynamism + Complexity

where
Performance

=

ROIC, Debt/Equity, or Quick ratio

=

Decline Severity, Firm Size, Market

Control
Variables

Share
Munificence

=

Sales Growth + Employment Growth

Dynamism

=

Variability in Sales Growth +
Variability in Employment Growth

Complexity

=

Aggregate market share of largest
four companies in a firm's primary
industry

Hypotheses 4a through 4c, 5a through 5c, and 6a through
6c predict that TMG characteristics-strategy interactions
will moderate the effect of environmental factors on
performance.

These hypotheses, therefore, integrate
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strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment.
tested using subgroup analysis.

They were

Firms were first classified

according to the turnaround strategy implemented.

Next,

firms were classified according to TMG career orientation.
For each orientation, the correlation between the change in
environmental factors and performance was determined, and
Fisher's z.-test was employed to test for significant
differences across correlations.
Summary
This chapter has addressed methodological issues
related to testing hypotheses derived in Chapter 3.

First,

issues related to sample selection using the COMPUSTAT data
base were highlighted.

Next, issues related to employing

slack as a measure of performance were detailed.
Additionally, measures of strategy, TMG characteristics,
environmental dimensions, and performance were presented.
Finally, methods for testing each hypothesis as well as
issues related to cluster analysis were discussed.

The

results of these tests are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter reports preliminary analyses investigating
the validities of the proposed measures and cluster analyses
of strategy and TMG variables.

It then presents results for

tests examining each stated hypothesis.
Preliminary Analyses
This section presents the results of preliminary
analyses to establish the validity of the proposed
performance and environmental measures.

It also presents

results from cluster analyses of strategy and TMG variables.
Correlations and descriptive statistics are shown in Table
5.1.

In addition, a list of industries and firms in the

sample are shown in Table 5.2.
Note that preliminary analysis showed that three
variables, Size, Market Share and Average Stock Ownership,
had skewed distributions.

These variables, therefore, were

transformed by taking the natural logarithm of each.
Correlations and descriptive statistics reflect these
transformations.
Validities
To establish the construct validity of variables with
multiple measures, factor analysis was employed.

Construct

validity was assessed for performance measures and
environmental measures.
First, to determine the dimensionality of performance
measures, a factor analysis with a varimax rotation was
90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Mean

sd

.20

.56

2. Employees

-.12

.43

.44

3. Inventory

.14

.60

.42

61

4. SGA

.32

.77

.48

68

.67

5. Dom. initiative

.36

.51

.10

02

o

•

CO

.07

-.28

.37

.26

24

.23

.27

-.26

.33

40

.45

.57

.44

-.10

.06

16

-.16

-.12

0

•
1

-.12

-.07

-.14

06

-.14

.07

-.14

-.10

VO

-.07

.04

29

.25

.22

•
H-*
O

.17

-.09

-.24

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

7

9

Variable
Strategy
1. P&E

6. Dom. reduction
7. Strategy"

3.81

1.83

9. Specialization"
10. Stock ownership

1.17

2.21

o

8. Number of mgrs.

•

TMG

l
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Table 5.1— Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables

.07

(Table con'd)
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sd

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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9.84
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20. Available slack

-.05

.05 -.07

.07

.03

.00

.04

-.15

.06

.08

21. Potential slack

-.14 -.02 -.06

.04

.28

.13

- .12

.15

.12

-.02

13. Complexity
Control

16. Severity
17. Mgt. turnover
Performance

- .22

Note: n=119 except for Potential Slack where n=lll as well as Stock Ownership and Mgt.
Turnover where n=99. All correlations greater than ±.18 are significant at e <.05 except
for correlations with Potential Slack, Stock Ownership and Management Turnover where
correlations greater than ±.19 are significant at pc.05.
8 These are nominal variables.

Thus, means and standard deviations are not meaningful.
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Table 5.2— Firms in Sample
Industry Code

Company

2092 Farmer Brothers
2200 Concord Fabrics Inc.
Dixie Yarn
2211 Crown Crafts Inc.
2221 Texfi Industries
2250 Alba Waldensian Inc
2253 Aileen Inc.
2300 Garan Inc.
Hartmarx Corporation
2320 Farah Inc.
Munsingwear Inc.
2390 Decorator Industries
2421 La-Pacific Corporation
2531 Douglas & Lomason
2621 Boise Cascade Corp.
Champion International
International Paper
Pope & Talbot Inc.
Potlach Corporation
Willamette Industries
2670 Bemis Company
2721 Playboy Enterprises
2732 Courier Corporation
2810 ICN Pharmaceuticals Inc.
NL Industries
2821 Goodrich (BF) Company
2860 Union Carbide
2890 Hercules Inc.
2911 Crown Central Petroleum
Murphy Oil Corporation
Tesoro Petroleum Corp.
2990 Triangle Corporation
3080 Hanna (MA) Company
3089 Kerr Group Inc.
3140 Suave Shoe Corporation
Wellco Enterprises
3310 Matec Corporation
National Standard Co.
3312 Armco Inc.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Inland Steel Inc.
Keystone Consolidated
Laclede Steel
3350 Driver Harris Company
Nuclear Metals

Industry Code

Company

3420 Amdura Corporation
3442 Instrument Systems Corp.
3443 Mueller (Paul) Company
Pitt-Des Moines Inc.
3460 Fansteel Inc.
3470 Kinark Corporation
3490 Intermagnetics General
3523 Art's Way Manufacturing
3531 JLG Industries Inc.
Portec Inc.
3532 Joy Technologies Inc.
3540 Salem Corporation
3541 Cincinnati Milacron Inc.
Gleason Corporation
Monarch Machine Tool Co.
3559 Katy Industries
3560 Dresser Industries Inc.
Graham Corporation
Ingersoll-Rand Company
3561 Duriron Company Inc.
3562 Timken Company
3567 Bethlehem Corporation
3570 Data General Corporation
3571 Amdahl Corporation
Datapoint Corporation
3575 Wells-Gardner Electric
3577 Cambex Corporation
3578 Par Technology
3585 Continental Material
Fedders Corporation
Kysor Industrial Corp.
3612 Thermo Voltek Corp.
Waters Instruments Inc.
3621 Kollmorgen Corporation
3640 Aztec Manufacturing Co.
ILC Technology
Lamson & Sessions Co.
3651 Zenith Electronics Corp.
3661 Cognitronics Corporation
General Datacom Ind.
Plantronics Inc.
3663 Adage Inc.
General Instrument Corp.
Pico Products Inc.
(Table con'd)
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3670 CTS Corporation
Electronic Associates
3672 Altron Inc.
3674 Advanced Micro Devices
Alpha Industries
International Rectifier
Semtech Corporation
3678 Robinson Nugent Inc.
3679 Applied Magnetics
Computer Products Inc.
Espey Mfg & Electronic
3690 Arrow Automotive
3711 Chrysler Corporation
Ford Motor Company
General Motors Corp.
Navistar International
3714 Trico Products Corp.
3716 Winnebago Industries
3724 Sifco Industries
UNC Inc.
3790 Kit Mfg.
3812 Anaren Microwave
LaBarge Inc.

3821
3823

3824
3825
3826
3827
3829
3841
3844
3845
3861

Autoclave Engineers
Gelman Sciences Inc.
Kewaunee Scientific
Daniel Industries
Fischer & Porter Co.
Hurco Companies
K-tron International
Moore Products
Bowmar Instruments
Datum Inc.
01 Corp.
Larer Precision
Optical Coating
Acme-Cleveland
Cordis Cop.
Puritan-Bennett
American Sci. Eng.
Circon Corp.
Datascope Corp.
Polaroid Corp.
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conducted.

A varimax rotation was employed to simplify the

factor matrix and facilitate interpretation (Hair et al.f
1992).

The results sure shown in Table 5.3.

Results in Table 5.3 show that two factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained (Kaiser, 1970).
Measures of profitability loaded highly on Factor 1, and
slack measures loaded highly on Factor 2.

The negative

loading for available slack also conforms with expectations
because the slack measures employed should be negatively
correlated (i.e., an increase in the potential slack
measure, debt to equity, indicates a decrease in overall
slack).

These results provide evidence that the proposed

profitability and slack variables measure distinct
constructs.14

Even though available and potential slack

load on the same factor, they were analyzed separately
because they have been found to have different effects on
organizational outcomes (e.g., risk taking; Singh, 1986).
Construct validity for the proposed performance
measures was also assessed by testing convergent and
predictive validities (Venkatraman & Grant, 1986).

To

assess convergent validity, the proposed slack measures were
compared to other theoretical measures of slack.

First, the

quick ratio, which measures a firm's liquid resources, was
compared with a firm's retained earnings, which provides
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Table 5.3— Rotated Factor Pattern for Performance Measures
Factor 1

Factor 2

Profitability

.8547

.1394

Pro fitab i1ity relative to
risk free rate

.8729

-.1178

Available slack

-.0517

-.7222

Potential slack

-.0384

.8174

Eigenvalue

1.4984

1.2211

.3746

.3053

Proportion of variance
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another measure of available slack (Bourgeois & Singh,
1983).

A positive correlation of .3348 (pc.OOl) was found

between these two measures.

Although this correlation is

not high (Nunnally, 1967), it is significant and positive as
expected.

Thus, it provides some evidence of convergent

validity.
Second, a firm's debt to equity ratio, which measures
environmental resource availability, was compared with a
firm's price/earnings ratio, which provides another measure
of potential slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983).

This

correlation was not significant (r=.0897, e <.40), which may
be due in part to the volatility of stock prices for
distressed firms (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988).

Consequently,

each firm's debt to equity ratio was compared to a second
measure of potential slack, interest coverage ratio (Barker,
1992; Bromiley, 1991).

A firm's interest coverage ratio

provides a measure of potential slack because firms having a
high ratio can afford to take on additional debt.
correlation between these measures was -.2210

The

(p<.05).

Although this correlation is not high (Nunnally, 1967), it
is significant and negative as expected.
some evidence of convergent validity.

Thus, it provides

All measures were

taken from COMPUSTAT and Moody's Industrial Reports.
To assess predictive validity, the proposed performance
measures were compared with measures of slack that reflect
outcomes of decline.

One such measure is a firm's dividend
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payout ratio.

To assess predictive validity, each firm's

quick ratio was compared to its dividend payout lagged one
year.

The correlation between these measures approached

significance (£= .1496, jjc.IO).

Closer examination of the

data, however, showed that over half (n = 67) the firms in
the focal sample did not pay dividends during the focal
timeframe.

Removing these firms from the sample resulted in

a correlation of .2201 (joe. 06).

Although this correlation

is not high (Nunnally, 1967), it approached significance and
is positive as expected.

Thus, it provides some evidence of

predictive validity.
Another slack measure which may change following
decline is a firm's credit rating.

To assess predictive

validity, each firm's debt to equity ratio was be compared
to its credit rating lagged one year.

A negative

correlation between these measures was found (£ = -.1953,
E<.50).

This lack of significance may occur in part because

only 19 firms in the sample had debt instruments rated by
Moody's during the focal timeframe.

The correlation,

however, is in the hypothesized direction.

These measures

were taken from COMPUSTAT, Moody's Industrial Reports and
Moody's Bond Record.
To establish the construct validity of the
environmental variables, factor analysis was employed.

The

multiple measures of munificence and dynamism were analyzed
using factor analysis with a varimax rotation.

Three
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factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained
(Kaiser, 1970).

Sales growth and employment growth loaded

highly on Factor 1.

Operating income growth and operating

income dynamism loaded highly on Factor 2 and appear to be
tapping a construct unique to operating income.

Sales

dynamism and employment dynamism loaded highly on Factor 3.
Because the operating income variables loaded on a single
factor that is not theoretically meaningful to the current
dissertation, they were removed and the remaining variables
were factor analyzed again using a varimax rotation. The
results are shown in Table 5.4.
Results in Table 5.4 show that two factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained (Kaiser, 1970).
Measures of sales growth and employment growth loaded highly
on Factor 1, whereas measures of sales dynamism and
employment dynamism loaded highly on Factor 2.

The two

variables for each factor, therefore, were summed to create
munificence and dynamism variables, respectively (Hair et
al., 1992).
Cluster analysis
To classify firms by their respective turnaround
strategies and TMGs by their respective career
specializations, cluster analysis was employed.

The

following clustering procedures were performed for both
strategy and TMG variables.

To obtain an estimate of the

number of clusters present in the data and to eliminate
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Table 5.4— Rotated Factor Pattern for
Environmental Variables
Factor 1

Factor 2

Sales growth

.9473

.0425

Employment growth

.9500

.1358

-.0517

.8743

.2370

.8174

2.0328

1.2787

.5082

.3197

Sales dynamism
Employment dynamism
Eigenvalue
Proportion of variance
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outliers (Hair et al., 1992), the data were analyzed using a
hierarchical cluster analysis procedure, Ward's minimum
variance method.

To determine the number of clusters, two

stopping rules, change in pseudo t2 statistic and visual
inspection of tree diagrams were employed (Aldenderfer &
Blashfield, 1984; Hair et al., 1992; SAS Institute, 1985).
These stopping rules indicated that a four-cluster solution
provided a good fit for the strategy data and a threecluster solution provided a good fit for the TMG data.

Both

solutions are also in line with the number of clusters
expected from a priori theory (cf. Ketchen & Shook, in
press).
To examine the validity of the resulting cluster
solutions, reliability was examined by randomly splitting
the sample into two subgroups (Ketchen & Shook, in press).
These subgroups were cluster analyzed, and the resulting
clusters were then compared with the full sample to assess
stability of cluster assignments and make sure the
clustering techniques were not taking advantage of random
variation (Hair et al., 1992).

The average agreement of

subgroups with the original sample was .79 for the strategy
clusters and .73 for the TMG clusters.

Both of these

results indicate that cluster assignments were highly
reliable (Nunnally, 1967).
To overcome problems with hierarchical cluster analysis
discussed above, the cluster centroids from this
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hierarchical analysis were then input into an iterative
clustering procedure, FASTCLUS, to refine cluster
assignments.

Means for the resulting four strategy clusters

and three TMG clusters are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6,
respectively.
Table 5.5 shows that three clusters correspond to the
strategy hypotheses developed in Chapter 3.

Examining the

mean values to name the clusters indicated that firms in
cluster 1 implemented a domain offense strategy, firms in
cluster 2 implemented a retrenchment strategy, and firms in
cluster 4 implemented a domain creation strategy.

Firms in

cluster 3 appear to have implemented a hybrid strategy
combining domain offense and domain creation.

The three

strategies corresponding to the hypotheses were retained for
analysis.
Table 5.6 shows that each of three clusters had a
dominant TMG specialization.

Examining the mean values to

name the clusters indicated that TMGs in cluster 1 had a
core specialization, TMGs in cluster 2 had an administrative
specialization, and TMGs in cluster 3 had an environmental
specialization.

The average TMG size was 3.81 members

(sd=l.83).
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis states that firms following a
retrenchment strategy would outperform those following other
turnaround strategies.

Restated formally:
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HI:

Firms implementing retrenchment strategies
(i.e., an efficiency strategy or a domainconsolidation strategy) following a
performance decline will outperform firms
implementing a domain-offense or a domaincreation strategy.

To determine each firm's turnaround strategy, firms
were classified employing the two-step cluster analysis
method described above.
ANOVA.

Hypothesis 1 was tested using

A significant E-statistic would indicate that

systematic performance differences exist across turnaround
strategies.

Results are shown in Table 5.7.

When testing

all hypotheses, performance measures greater than three
standard deviations from the mean were removed.15
Results in Table 5.7 do not support Hypothesis 1.

No

significant differences in performance were found across
turnaround strategies for any performance measure.

Thus,

the hypothesis that firms implementing a retrenchment
strategy would outperform firms implementing a domainoffense or domain-creation strategy was not supported.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis states that the interaction
between TMG characteristics and a firm's turnaround strategy
has implications for performance.

These TMG characteristics

include both specialization and stock ownership.
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Table 5.5— Cluster Analysis for Strategy Variables

Cluster Means
n

p &e

Inv

Emp

SGA

DI

DR

1

70

.26

.20

-.11

.24

.09

-.08

2

48

-.23

-.35

-.44

-.25

.49

-.58

3

12

2.56

1.73

1.02

2.36

.51

-.54

4

26

.79

.96

.37

1.43

.64

-.16

P&E=
Inv=
Emp=
SGA=
DI =
DR =

Plant & equipment
Inventory
Employees
Sales, general, and administrative expenses
Domain initiative
Domain reduction

Table 5 .6— Cluster Analysis for TMG Variables
Cluster Means
(standard deviations)
n

Core

Administrative Env ironmenta1

1

55

.7178
(.1648)

.1705
(.1701 )

.1117
(.1402)

2

30

.1291
(.1505)

.6573
(.1937)

.2136
(.1888)

3

44

.2093
(.1834)

.1491
(.1519)

.6416
(.2160)
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Table 5.7 — Performance Differences Among
Turnaround Strategies

df

Mean Square

Z

Pr>£

.70

.50

.03

.97

1.42

.25

2.04

.14

Profitability
Model

2

2.40

Error

96

3.41

Total

98

Profitability/
Risk Free
Model

2

.08

Error

98

2.25

Total

100

Available Slack
Model

2

.44

Error

108

.31

Total

110

Potential Slack
Model

2

1.21

Error

90

.59

Total

92
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Hypotheses 2a through 2c state that firms whose TMGs
have specializations that match particular turnaround
strategies will outperform firms whose TMGs do not have this
match.

Restated formally:

H2a: Firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
TMGs have a core-function specialization will
outperform those firms whose TMGs have
administrative- or environmental-function
specializations.
H2b: Firms implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMGs have an administrative-function
specialization will outperform those firms whose
TMGs have core- or environmental-function
specializations.
H2c: Firms implementing a domain-creation strategy
whose TMGs have an environmental-function
specialization will outperform those firms whose
TMGs have core- or administrative-function
specializations.
To determine each firm's TMG orientation, TMGs were
classified employing the two-step cluster analysis method
described above.
using ANOVA.

Hypothesis 2a through 2c were then tested

A significant F-statistic would indicate that

systematic performance differences exist across TMG
specializations for each turnaround strategy.

Next, because

dividing three TMG specializations by three strategies
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resulted in small cell sizes (i.e., mean cell sizes were
13.3, 16.2, and 7.2 for retrenchment, domain offense, and
domain creation, respectively), hypotheses 2a through 2c
were also tested by performing contrasts between the
hypothesized highest performing specialization and the other
two specializations.
First, these hypotheses were tested using ANOVA.
Results are shown in Tables 5.8 through 5.10.
Results in Table 5.8 do not support Hypothesis 2a.

No

significant differences in performance were found across TMG
specializations for firms implementing a retrenchment
strategy.

Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs having a core

specialization will be able to implement a retrenchment
strategy better than TMGs with either an administrative or
environmental specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.9 do not support Hypothesis 2b.

No

significant differences in performance were found across TMG
specializations for firms implementing a domain offense
strategy.

Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs having an

administrative specialization will be able to implement a
domain offense strategy better than TMGs with either a core
or environmental specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.10 do not support Hypothesis 2c.
Only differences in potential slack approach significance
(E<.10) across TMG specializations for firms implementing a
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Table 5.8— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Retrenchment Strategy

df

Mean Square

£

Pr>£

.27

.77

.08

.92

.73

.49

.10

.90

Profitability
Model

2

.80

Error

29

2.96

Total

31

Profitability/
Risk Free
Model

2

.43

Error

35

5.39

Total

37

Available Slack
Model

2

.18

Error

39

.25

Total

41

Potential Slack
Model

2

.09

Error

32

.88

Total

34
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Table 5.9— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Offense Strategy

df

Mean Square

F

Pr>F

Profitability
Model

2

5.45

Error

40

2.67

Total

42

2.04

.14

2.32

.11

.50

.61

.01

.99

Profitability/
Risk Free
Model

2

2.74

Error

46

1.18

Total

48

Available Slack
Model

2

.08

Error

44

.17

Total

46

Potential Slack
Model

2

.00

Error

40

.17

Total

42
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Table 5.10— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Creation Strategy

Mean Square

M

2

Pr>£

.00

.99

1.39

.27

1.66

.21

2.68

.10

Profitability
Model

2

.00

Error

17

1.39

Total

19

Profitability/
Risk Free
Model

2

1.86

Error

20

1.34

Total

22

Available Slack
Model

2

.68

Error

21

.41

Total

23

Potential Slack
Model

2

1.24

Error

17

.46

Total

19
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domain creation strategy.

Examining group means using

Duncan's Multiple Range Test, however, shows that an
administrative specialization outperforms both core and
environmental specializations (p<.10).

These results aire

contrary to Hypothesis 2c.
One explanation for lack of significant performance
difference in the above hypotheses may be the small cell
sizes for each strategy after dividing by TMG
specialization.

Therefore, contrasts were performed between

the hypothesized highest performing specialization and the
other two specializations.

Comparing specializations in

this way allows the analysis to conserve one degree of
freedom. Results of these contrasts are shown in Tables 5.11
through 5.13.
Results in Table 5.11 again fail to support Hypothesis
2a.

No significant differences in performance were found

across TMG specializations for firms implementing a
retrenchment strategy (Only contrasts between core and other
specializations are shown).

Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs

having a core specialization will be able to implement a
retrenchment strategy better than TMGs with either an
administrative or environmental specialization was not
supported.
Results in Table 5.12 do not support Hypothesis 2b.
First, an environmental specialization outperformed other
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Table 5.11— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Retrenchment Strategy

df

Pr>£

Z

Profitabi1ity
Core vs Others

1

.00

.99

1

.02

.90

1

.03

.85

1

.03

.87

Profitability/
Risk Free
Core vs Others
Available Slack
Core vs Others
Potential Slack
Core vs Others
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Table 5.12— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Offense Strategy

df

Z

Pr>E

1
1

1.08
3.90

.31
.06

1
1

.11
4.47

.75
.04

1

.87

.36

1

.01

.91

Profitability
Administrative vs Others
Environmental vs Others
Pro f itab i 1 ity/
Risk Free
Administrative vs Others
Core vs Others
Available Slack
Administrative vs Others
Potential Slack
Administrative vs Others
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Table 5.13— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Creation Strategy

d£

Pr>£

Z

Profitability
Environmental vs Others

1

.01

.93

1

1.67

.21

1
1

1.20
3.32

.29
.08

1
1

.35
4.57

.56
.05

Profitability/
Risk Free
Environmental vs Others
Available Slack
Environmental vs Others
Administrative vs Others
Potential Slack
Environmental vs Others
Administrative vs Others
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specializations in terms of profitability (p<.lO).
finding is counter to Hypothesis 2b.

This

Results also show that

an administrative and an environmental specialization
outperform a core specialization in terms of profitability
relative to the risk-free rate.

Duncan's Multiple Range

Test shows that an administrative specialization outperforms
a core specialization on this measure (e < .10).

Thus, the

hypothesis that TMGs having an administrative specialization
will be able to implement a domain offense strategy better
than TMGs with either a core or environmental specialization
was not supported.
Results in Table 5.13 show that significant differences
exist across specializations for firms implementing a domain
creation strategy.

Contrary to expectations, however, an

administrative specialization outperformed the other two
specializations in terms of potential slack (p<.05) and
available slack (e < . 10).

Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs

having an environmental specialization will be able to
implement a domain creation strategy better than TMGs with
either a core or administrative specialization was not
supported.
Hypotheses 2d and 2e state that TMG stock ownership
will affect the successful implementation of a turnaround
strategy.

Hypothesis 2d states that TMG stock ownership

will be positively related to turnaround.

Restated

formally:
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£12d: There will be a positive relation between TMG
stock ownership and performance in declining
firms.
Hypothesis 2d was tested using multiple regression.
Stock data were available for 99 firms.

Initial

investigation showed that Average Market Share, a control
variable, was not significantly related to performance in
any analysis.

Therefore, this variable was excluded from

the analysis and the regression equations were reestimated.
Results are shown in Table 5.14.
Results in Table 5.14 show that average stock ownership
is significantly related to potential slack (p<.05) and
approaches significance with available slack (pc.lO).
Contrary to expectations, however, TMG stock ownership is
negatively related to performance for both slack measures.
First, stock ownership is positively associated with the
measure for potential slack, a firm's debt to equity ratio.
Thus, the higher a TMG's average stock ownership, the more a
firm's debt load increased, and, in turn, the more a firm's
slack decreased.

Second, stock ownership is negatively

related to the measure for available slack, a firm's
liquidity ratio.

Thus, the higher a TMG's average stock

ownership, the more a firm's liquidity decreased, and, in
turn, the more a firm's slack decreased.

Both these results

are counter to Hypothesis 2d.
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Hypothesis 2e states that the positive relation between
stock ownership and performance will be stronger for firms
implementing a domain creation strategy.

Restated formally:

H2e: There will be a stronger positive relation between
stock ownership and turnaround for declining firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy than for
firms implementing either a domain-offense or
retrenchment strategy.
This hypothesis was tested using subgroup analysis.
First, firms were classified by turnaround strategy
implemented.

Then for each strategy, the correlation

between average stock ownership and performance was
computed.

Fisher's z.-test was employed to test for

significant differences across correlations (Bruning &
Kintz, 1987).

Results are shown in Table 5.15.

Results in Table 5.15 do not support Hypothesis 2e.

No

significant differences in the correlation between stock
ownership and performance occur across strategies.

Thus,

the hypothesis that there will be a stronger positive
relation between TMG stock ownership and performance for
firms implementing a domain creation strategy than for firms
implementing other strategies is not supported.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis states that a firm's environment
will impact its turnaround.

Restated formally:
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Table 5.14— Relation Between Stock Ownership and Performance

Profitability

Profitability/
Risk Free

Variables

b

b

Intercept
Size
Management Turnover
Severity
Average Stock Ownership

.07
.43*
-1.90*
-.09
.29

R2

SE

1.53
.21
.84
.79
.19

Intercept
Size
Management Turnover
Severity
Average Stock Ownership
R2
* E < .10, * £ < .05,

1.11
.04
-1.11*
.90
-.13

.12*

b

Potential
Slack
SE

.21
-.02
-.15
.15
-.08*
.05

1.07
.15
.60
.57
.14

.06

Available
Slack
Variables

SE

b

.34
.04
.19
.17
.04

-1.3 3**
.20**
.74**
-.22
.13*
.10*

E < •01
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Table 5.15— Correlations and Differences in Correlations
Between Stock Ownership and Performance
for Different Turnaround Strategies

Performance Measure

Stock Ownership

Retrenchment
Profitability (n=32)
Profitability/Risk Free

.14
(n=28)

-.24

Available Slack (n=34)

-.10

Potential Slack (n=31)

.07

Domain Offense
Profitability (n=37)

-.01

Profitability/Risk Free (n=41)

-.13

Available Slack (n=44)

-.20

Potential Slack (n=38)

.00

Domain Creation
Profitability (n=18)

-.24

-.24

.01

.01

Available Slack (n=17)

-.15

-.15

Potential Slack (n=17)

.08

.08

Profitability/Risk Free

(n=19)

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was

p<.05.
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Table 5.16— Relation Between Environmental Variables
and Performance

Variables

Profitability

Profitability/
Risk Free

b

b

Intercept
Severity
Size
Munificence
Dynamism
Complexity

SE

3.86*
.26
.06
-.06
.40*
-.04*

R2

1.83
.63
.15
.03
.20
.02

Intercept
Severity
Size
Munificence
Dynamism
Complexity
R2

2.00
.61
.10
-.02
-.03
-.02

.09*

b

Potential
Slack
SE

-.29
.02
.03
.01
.01
.00
.02

1.28
.45
.10
.02
.14
.01

.05

Available
Slack
Variables

SE

b

.41
.15
.03
.01
.04
.00

SE

.03
-.14
.04
-.01
.01
-.00
.05

+ E < .10, * p < .05, ** E < -01
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g3a: Environmental munificence will be positively
related to performance in declining firms.
H3b: Environmental dynamism will be negatively related
to performance in declining firms.
33c: Environmental complexity will be negatively
related to performance in declining firms.
Hypothesis 3a through 3c were tested using multiple
regression.

Again, initial analysis showed that Average

Market Share was not significant in any equations.
Therefore, it was removed and regression equations were
reestimated.

Results are shown in Table 5.16.

Results in Table 5.16 show that the environmental
variables have only a limited relation with performance for
firms in a turnaround situation.

Dynamism and complexity

are significantly related only with profitability and both
relations are opposite the ones hypothesized.

Additionally,

the amount of variance in profitability explained by
environmental variables is relatively small (R^.09).
Thus, the hypotheses that environmental characteristics will
impact turnaround received only limited support.
Hypotheses 4. 5. and 6
Hypotheses 4 through 6 seek to integrate concepts of
turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental
variables.

Hypothesis 4 states that firms whose TMGs fit

with a firm's strategy will be able to better capitalize on
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environmental munificence than firms whose TMGs do not have
this fit with strategy.

Restated formally:

H4a: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
TMG have a core-function specialization than
for firms whose TMG has either an
administrative- or environmental-function
specialization.
H4b: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMG have an administrative-function
specialization than for firms whose TMG has
either an core- or environmental-function
specialization.
H4c: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose
TMG have an environmental-function
specialization than for firms whose TMG has
either a core- or administrative-function
specialization.
Hypotheses 4 through 6 were tested using subgroup
analysis.

First, firms were classified by turnaround

strategy implemented. Next, firms were classified by TMG
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career orientation.

Then for each TMG-strategy combination,

the correlation between each environmental characteristic
and performance was computed.

Fisher's z.-test was employed

to test for significant differences across correlations
(Bruning & Kintz, 1987).

Results for Hypotheses 4a through

4c are shown in Tables 5.17 through 5.19, respectively.
Results in Table 5.17 do not support Hypothesis 4a.

No

significant differences in the correlation between
environmental munificence and performance occur across TMG
specializations.

Thus, the hypothesis that environmental

munificence will be more positively related to turnaround
for firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose TMG
have a core-function specialization than for firms whose TMG
has either an administrative- or environmental-function
specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.18 provide mixed support for
Hypothesis 4b.

The correlation between environmental

munificence and performance is significantly higher for an
administrative versus environmental specialization and
approaches significance (p<.10) for an administrative versus
core specialization in terms of potential slack (Recall
potential slack is reverse-scored).

Thus, the hypothesis

that environmental munificence will be more positively
related to turnaround for firms implementing a domain
offense strategy whose TMG have an administrative-function
specialization than for firms whose TMG has either a core-
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Table 5.17— Retrenchment Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Munificence and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Munificence

Core
Profitability (n=10)

-.31

-.31

Profitability/Risk Free (n=10)

-.51

-.51

Available Slack (n=10)

-.17

-.17

Potential Slack (n=10)

-.27

-.27

Administrative
Profitability (n=ll)

-.34

Profitability/Risk Free (n=12)

-.28

Available Slack (n=12)

.10

Potential Slack (n=10)

-.65

Environmental
Profitability (n=16)
Profitability/Risk Free (n=17)

-.65
-.25

Available Slack (n=17)

.29

Potential Slack (n=16)

-.04

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
E< •05.
E<.
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Table 5.18— Domain Offense Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Munificence and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Munificence

Core
Profitability (n=21)
Profitability/Risk Free

-.14
(n=25)

-.27

Available Slack (n=28)

-.14

Potential Slack (n=25)

.14

Administrative
Profitability (n=9)
Profitability/Risk Free

.38
(n=9)

-.39

.38
-.39

Available Slack (n=9)

.06

.06

Potential Slack (n=9)

-.54*

-.54*

Environmental
Profitability (n=7)
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9)
Available Slack (n=10)
Potential Slack (n=9)

-.17
.08
-.41
.30

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
E<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
E<.05.
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Table 5.19— Domain Creation Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Munificence and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Munificence

Core
Profitability (n=8)

.74

Profitability/Risk Free (n=9)

.55

Available Slack (n=9)

.03

Potential Slack (n=9)

.02

Administrative
Profitability (n=4)

-.39

Profitability/Risk Free (n=4)

.31

Available Slack (n=5)

.16

Potential Slack (n=5)

.58

Environmental
Profitability (n=8)

.71

.71

Profitability/Risk Free (n=9)

.64

.64

Available Slack (n=9)

.11

.11

Potential Slack (n=5)

.52

.52

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was

p<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .05.
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or environmental-function specialization received mixed
support.
Results in Table 5.19 do not support Hypothesis 4c.

No

significant differences in the correlation between
environmental munificence and performance occur across TMG
specializations.

Thus, the hypothesis that environmental

munificence will be more positively related to turnaround
for firms implementing a domain creation strategy whose TMG
have an environmental-function specialization than for firms
whose TMG has either a core or an administrative-function
specialization was not supported.
Hypothesis 5 states that firms whose TMGs fit with a
finn's strategy will be able to better cope with
environmental dynamism than firms whose TMGs do not have
this fit with strategy.

Restated formally:

H5a: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
TMG have a core-function specialization than
for firms whose TMG has either an
administrative- or environmental-function
specialization.
H5b: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMG have an administrative-function
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specialization than for firms whose TMG has
either an core- or environmental-function
specialization.
H5c: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose
TMG have an environmental-function
specialization them for firms whose TMG has
either a core- or administrative-function
specialization.
Results for these hypotheses are shown in Tables 5.20
through 5.22.
Results in Table 5.20 do not support Hypothesis 5a.
The correlation between environmental dynamism and
profitability for an administrative specialization is higher
(p<.10) than for a core specialization.

Thus, the

hypothesis that environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to turnaround for firms implementing a
retrenchment strategy whose TMG have a core-function
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have either an
administrative- or environmental-function specialization was
not supported.
Results in Table 5.21 do not support Hypothesis 5b.
significant differences in the correlation between
environmental dynamism and performance occur across TMG
specializations.

Thus, the hypothesis that environmental
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Table 5.20— Retrenchment Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Dynamism and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Dynamism

Core
Profitability (n-10)

.03*

.03

Profitability/Risk Free (n=10)

.01

.01

Available Slack (n=10)

.03

.03

Potential Slack (n=10)

-.10

-.10

Administrative
Profitability (n=ll)

.64

Profitability/Risk Free (n=12)

.55

Available Slack (n=12)

.44

Potential Slack (n=10)

.31

Environmental
.14

Profitability (n=16)
Profitability/Risk Free (n=17)

-.13

Available Slack (n=17)

.25

Potential Slack (n=16)

-.20

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
P < .10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
P < .05.
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Table 5.21— Domain Offense Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Dynamism and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Dynamism

Core
Profitability (n=21)
Profitability/Risk Free

.03
(n=25)

.28

Available Slack (n=28)

-.07

Potential Slack (n=25)

.16

Administrative
Profitability (n=9)

-.19

-.19

-.02

-.02

Available Slack (n=9)

.25

.25

Potential Slack (n=9)

.21

.21

Profitability/Risk Free

(n=9)

Environmental
Profitability (n=7)

-.33

Profitability/Risk Free (n=9)

-.35

Available Slack (n=10)

-.37

Potential Slack (n=9)

-.19

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
P<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
P<.05.
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Table 5.22— Domain Creation Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Dynamism and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Dynamism

Core
Profitability (n=8)
Profitability/Risk Free

.16
(n=9)

-.31

Available Slack (n=9)

-.09

Potential Slack (n=9)

.06

Administrative
Profitability (n=4)

-.77

Profitability/Risk Free (n=4)

.08

Available Slack (n=5)

.25

Potential Slack (n=5)

.23

Environmental
Profitability (n=8)

.29

.29

.34

.34

Available Slack (n=9)

.78*

.78

Potential Slack (n=9)

-.11

-.11

Profitability/Risk Free

(n=9)

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .05.
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dynamism will be less negatively related to turnaround for
firms implementing a domain offense strategy whose TMG have
an administrative-function specialization than for firms
whose TMGs have either a core- or environmental-function
specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.22 provide mixed support for
Hypothesis 5c.

The correlation between environmental

dynamism and available slack is significantly higher for an
environmental specialization than for a core specialization.
Thus, the hypothesis that environmental dynamism will be
less negatively related to turnaround for firms implementing
a domain-creation strategy whose TMG have an environmentalfunction specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
either a core- or administrative-function specialization
received mixed support.
Hypothesis 6 states that firms whose TMGs fit with a
firm's strategy will be able to better cope with
environmental complexity than firms whose TMGs do not have
this fit with strategy.

Restated formally:

H6a: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
TMG have a core-function specialization than
for firms whose TMG has either an
administrative- or environmental-function
specialization.
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H6b: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related performance for firms
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose
TMG have an administrative-function
specialization than for firms whose TMG has
either an core- or environmental-function
specialization.
H6c: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose
TMG have an environmental-function
specialization than for firms whose TMG has
either a core- or administrative-function
specialization.
Results for these hypotheses are shown in Table 5.23
through 5.25.
Results in Table 5.23 do not support Hypothesis 6a.
The correlation between environmental complexity and
potential slack was significantly higher for an
administrative versus a core specialization in terms of
potential slack (Both potential slack and complexity are
reverse-scored).

Thus, the hypothesis that environmental

complexity will be less negatively related to turnaround for
firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose TMG have a
core-function specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
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Table 5.23— Retrenchment Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Complexity and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Complexity

Core
Profitability (n=10)

-.23

-.23

-.16

-.16

Available Slack (n=10)

.10

.10

Potential Slack (n=10)

-.36

-.36

Profitability/Risk Free

(n=10)

Administrative
Profitability (n=ll)
Profitability/Risk Free

-.51
(n=10)

Available Slack (n=12)
Potential Slack (n=9)

-.15
-.31
.57*

Environmental
Profitability (n=19)

-.33

Profitability/Risk Free (n=18)

-.40

Available Slack (n=20)

-.01

Potential Slack (n=16)

-.08

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was

E<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p<.05.
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Table 5.24— Domain Offense Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Complexity and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Complexity

Core
Profitability (n=26)
Profitability/Risk Free

-.25
(n=29)

-.09

Available Slack (n=32)

.04

Potential Slack (n=28)

-.09

Administrative
Profitability (n=10)

-.23

-.23

.18

.18

Available Slack (n=ll)

-.08

-.08

Potential Slack (n=10)

-.14

-.14

Profitability/Risk Free

(n=ll)

Environmental
Profitability (n=9)
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9)

.64

Available Slack (n=10)

.17

Potential Slack (n=8)
*

-.31

-.38

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was

p<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
E<.05.
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Table 5.25— Domain Creation Strategy:
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between
Environmental Complexity and Performance
for Different TMG Specializations

Performance Measure

Environmental Complexity

Core
Profitability (n=9)
Profitability/Risk Free

.45
(n=10)

.46

Available Slack (n=9)

.57

Potential Slack (n=9)

-.49

Administrative
Profitability (n=4)

.71

Profitability/Risk Free (n=4)

.13

Available Slack (n=4)

.75

Potential Slack (n=5)

.58

Environmental
Profitability (n=9)

-.22

-.22

-.01

-.01

Available Slack (n=9)

.75

.75

Potential Slack (n=6)

-.63

Profitability/Risk Free

(n=4)

-.63*

Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .05.
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either an administrative- or environmental-function
specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.24 do not support Hypothesis 6b.

No

significant differences in the correlation between
environmental complexity and available slack occur across
TMG specializations.

Thus, the hypothesis that

environmental complexity will be less negatively related to
turnaround for firms implementing a domain-offense strategy
whose TMG have an administrative-function specialization
than for firms whose TMGs have either a core- or
environmental function specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.25 do not support Hypothesis 6c.
The correlation between environmental complexity and
available slack approached significance (p<.10) for an
administrative specialization compared to an environmental
specialization.

Thus, the hypothesis that environmental

complexity will be less negatively related to turnaround for
firms implementing a domain-creation strategy whose TMG have
an environmental-function specialization than for firms
whose TMGs have either a core- or administrative- function
specialization was not supported.
Summary
This chapter has presented the results of tests of the
dissertation's hypotheses.

The relation between turnaround

strategy and turnaround was not significant.
Hypothesis 1 was not supported.

Therefore,

The importance of TMG-
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strategy interaction received mixed support.

Results for

Hypothesis 2c showed significant differences across TMG
specializations, although this relation was opposite that
hypothesized.

Additionally, the relation between TMG stock

ownership and performance was significant, but this relation
was also opposite that hypothesized.

Results for Hypotheses

3a through 3c showed only a limited relation between
environmental characteristics and performance.
Hypothesis 3a through 3c were not supported.

Hence,
Finally, the

combination of strategy, TMG characteristics, and
environment showed a few significant relations with
performance.
The next chapter discusses these results.

It also

draws implications for future turnaround research and
discusses limitations of the present investigation.
Additionally, the chapter offers suggestions for future
research.
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CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS AMD CONCLUSION
This dissertation examined unresolved issues related to
organizational turnaround.

To address these issues, it

developed and tested a series of hypotheses that
investigated the effects of turnaround strategy, TMG
characteristics, and environment on turnaround.

These

components are critical in a firm's alignment and, thus, to
its performance.

Consequently, resolving issues in

turnaround research required gaining insight into these
factors affecting alignment.
This chapter discusses the results presented in Chapter
5.

First, it summarizes results from each hypothesis.

Based on these results, it presents implications for the
role of turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and
environment in organizational turnaround.

Then, it

discusses limitations of the present investigation.
Finally, the chapter outlines possible future research
avenues.
Summary of results
Hypothesis 1 examined the effect that turnaround
strategy has on turnaround.

Previous literature has focused

on the efficacy of particular turnaround strategies and, to
date, conflicting results have occurred.

As noted, part of

this ambiguity may exist because of previous studies have
employed different classification schemes or they have used
broad classification schemes that aggregate different
140
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strategies.

To overcome these problems, the dissertation

first developed a continuum of turnaround strategies based
on previous studies of decline (Miles, 1982; Zammuto &
Cameron, 1985).

Next, firms were classified according to

the strategy that they implemented, and performance was
compared across strategies. Drawing from recent empirical
turnaround studies, Hypothesis 1 stated that a retrenchment
strategy would outperform both a domain offense and a domain
creation strategy.

This hypothesis was not supported.

This

finding suggests that other factors have to be considered
along with turnaround strategy in studying how firms regain
alignment and turn around.
Another factor impacting a firm's alignment is its TMG.
Managers perform boundary-spanning functions between a
firm's internal processes and its environment (Andrews,
1971; Child, 1972; Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & Mason,
1984) .

Additionally, because TMG members have different

skills, motives, and interpretations of organizational and
environmental stimuli, they play a critical role in
reestablishing alignment and turning a firm around.

To

date, however, investigation of a TMG's role has been
limited to studying whether incumbent TMG members should be
replaced by new managers following a performance decline
(Furtado & Karan, 1990; Kesner & Sebora,

1994).

Thus, this

dissertation is the first study to move beyond this limited
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focus to examine the role that TMG talents have in
organizational turnaround.
Hypotheses 2a through 2c examined the role of a TMG's
functional, company, and industry background has on its
ability to implement particular turnaround strategies.
These hypotheses stated that a fit between TMG
characteristics and turnaround strategy would lead to higher
performance.

Hypothesis 2a stated that firms implementing a

retrenchment strategy whose TMGs had a core-function
specialization would outperform firms whose TMGs had other
specializations.

This hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 2b stated that firms implementing a domain
offense strategy whose TMGs had an administrative-function
specialization would outperform firms whose TMGs had other
specializations.

This hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 2c stated that firms implementing a domain
creation strategy whose TMGs had an environmental-function
specialization would outperform firms whose TMGs had other
specializations.

Contrary to expectations, firms whose TMGs

had administrative-function specializations outperformed
firms whose TMGs had other specializations.
Another characteristic that may affect TMG motives for
implementing particular strategies is stock ownership.
Thus, Hypotheses 2d and 2e examined the relation between TMG
stock ownership and turnaround.

Hypothesis 2d stated that

because increased TMG stock ownership can align a TMG's
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goals with stockholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), higher
stock ownership would lead to increased performance.
Contrary to expectations, increased TMG stock ownership led
to lower performance in terms of available and potential
slack.
Additionally, because managers have an incentive to
diversify to diffuse their employment risk in decline
situations (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling,

1976),

the effect of TMG stock ownership may be most pronounced in
the context of a domain creation strategy.

Thus, Hypothesis

2e stated that the relation between stock ownership and
turnaround would be higher for firms implementing domain
creation strategies than for firms implementing other
strategies.

This hypothesis was not supported.

A third component affecting a firm's alignment is the
nature of the environment with which firms interact
(Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel,

1978; Porter,

1980).

Previous turnaround research had investigated broad
environmental characteristics such as industry growth rate
(Ramanujam,

1984) or overall economic growth (Schendel et

al., 1976).

This dissertation moved beyond these narrow

views of environment to investigate the effect of
environmental munificence, dynamism, and complexity on
turnaround.

Hypothesis 3a through 3c stated that

munificence would be positively related to turnaround,
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whereas dynamism and complexity would be negatively related
to turnaround.

None of these hypotheses was supported.

The above hypotheses investigated the individual
effects of strategy, TMG-strategy interaction, and
environment on turnaround.

To provide a comprehensive view

of the turnaround process, the dissertation also studied the
combined effects of these variables.

Thus, Hypotheses 4

through 6 investigated the effects of environmental
variables on turnaround given specific TMG-strategy
interactions.

These hypotheses posited that firms whose

TMGs specializations fit with the firm's turnaround strategy
would be better able to take advantage of environmental
munificence or better mitigate problems created by
environmental dynamism and complexity.

Thus, Hypotheses 4a

through 4c stated that environmental munificence would be
more positively related to performance for firms whose TMGstrategy profiles matched those posited in Hypotheses 2a
through 2c than for firms whose TMGs had other profiles.
Hypothesis 4b, which stated that environmental munificence
would be more positively related to performance for firms
implementing a domain offense strategy whose TMGs had an
administrative specialization than for firms whose TMGs had
other specializations, received mixed support.

Hypotheses

4a and 4c were not supported.
Hypotheses 5a-5c stated that environmental dynamism
would be less negatively related to performance for firms
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whose TMG-strategy profiles matched those posited in
Hypotheses 2a through 2c than for firms whose TMGs had other
profiles.

Hypothesis 5c, which stated that environmental

dynamism would be less negatively related to performance for
firms implementing a domain creation strategy whose TMGs had
an environmental specialization than for firms whose TMGs
had other specializations, received mixed support.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported.
Hypotheses 6a through 6c stated that environmental
complexity would be less negatively related to performance
for firms whose TMG profiles matched those posited in
Hypotheses 2a through 2c than for firms whose TMGs had other
profiles.

Hypothesis 6a stated that environmental

complexity would be less negatively related to performance
for firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose TMGs
had a core specialization than for firms whose TMGs had
other specializations.

Contrary to expectations, the

opposite relation was found.

Hypotheses 6b and 6c were not

supported.
Results from these integrative hypotheses, though
limited, suggest the importance of studying turnaround in
terms of comprehensive alignment among strategy, TMG
characteristics, and environment.

Investigating each of

these three components individually provided only limited
insight into turnaround.

Examining performance as a

function of the alignment among its strategy, and top
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management characteristics, and environment, however,
offered some additional insights into turnaround.
Discussion of significant findings
Several implications can be drawn from these results.
These implications will be discussed in terms of strategy,
TMG characteristics, environment, and the integration of all
three factors.
For research on turnaround strategies, the dissertation
provides two important results.

First, preliminary analysis

showed that three of the strategies on the continuum existed
in the sample.

Although based on cluster analysis, which

can find patterns in random data (Barney & Hoskisson,

1990),

these results provide some support for framing turnaround
strategies in terms of the continuum proposed in this
dissertation.

In addition, the continuum is based on

previous studies of decline (Miles, 1982; Zammuto & Cameron,
1988), and it is collectively exhaustive (i.e., all
turnaround strategies can be placed on the continuum; cf.
Chrisman, Hofer, & Boulton, 1988).

Thus, the continuum may

prove useful for subsequent turnaround studies by
standardizing labels given to strategies and by providing
specific instead of consolidated strategies that firms can
implement to turn around.

It should also be noted that one

strategy on the continuum, domain consolidation, did not
emerge as a discrete strategy.

Possible reasons for this

will be discussed below.
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Second, the lack of support for Hypothesis 1 also has
important implications for turnaround research.

The finding

that none of the turnaround strategies consistently
outperformed all other strategies indicates four possible
situations— each firm's turnaround process may be too
idiosyncratic to generalize, equifinality may be operating,
other factors along with strategy may need to be considered,
or methodological issues may need to be addressed.

The

first three possibilities will be discussed next.
Methodological issues will be discussed in the Limitations
section.
First, the lack of significant results ma y indicate
that turnaround processes may be idiosyncratic for each
firm.

For example, examining the turnaround at Chrysler,

one of the most heralded success stories in U.S. corporate
history, shows some unique events.

One critical event that

helped Chrysler turn around was receiving U.S. government
loan guarantees.

Thus, part of Chrysler's turnaround

involved employing a political strategy instead of the
competitive strategies examined in this dissertation (Hofer
& Schendel, 1978).

Although each firm's turnaround

undoubtedly has unique components, certain aspects may
generalize.

For example, Chrysler's turnaround success also

resulted in part from its domain offense strategy which
included introducing new products such as the K-car and
minivan (Iacocca, 1983).
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These results may also indicate that some turnaround
strategies may be equally effective in helping firms recover
(i.e., equifinality may be operative, Thomas & Venkatraman,
1988).

Previous strategy research has found that more than

one strategy may lead to high performance in a particular
situation (Hambrick, 1983? Snow & Hrebeniak,

1980).

This

research has also shown, however, that strategies may vary
in effectiveness across situations.

In terms of turnaround

research, the possibility that equifinality ma y be operative
indicates that turnaround studies may need to specify the
context within which a particular turnaround strategy will
be effective.

For example, Pearce and Robbins

(1993) found

that firms implementing a retrenchment strategy outperformed
those not implementing a retrenchment strategy within the
context of a declining industry.

Results from this

dissertation indicate, however, that this strategy is not
the most effective strategy across all contexts.
Third, these results may indicate that turnaround
research needs to include variables along with a firm's
strategy.

Reviewing previous studies in Table 1, however,

shows that many studies have focused primarily on the
relation between a firm's turnaround strategy and its
subsequent performance.

Results from this dissertation

suggest that this focus may be too narrow given that several
other factors besides strategy affect a firm's alignment
(Summer et al., 1990).

Thus, no one "best" strategy exists
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for firms in all turnaround situations, and other factors
may need to be considered.
Another factor that could be considered is the role of
a firm's TMG in turnaround.

By focusing on each TMG's

functional, company, and industry background (White et al.,
1994), the present study moved beyond simply looking at the
frequently researched incumbent versus new management
distinction to examine the skills that managers need to
implement particular turnaround strategies.

Thus, the

dissertation investigated performance implications of TMGstrategy interaction for the first time in the context of
turnaround strategies.
Results show that firms implementing a domain offense
strategy whose TMGs have either an environmental or
administrative specialization outperform those firms whose
TMGs have a core specialization.

This result is consistent

with previous research that shows TMGs having an internal
focus do not implement external-oriented strategies well
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).

Results also show that firms

implementing a domain creation strategy whose TMGs have an
administrative specialization outperform firms whose TMGs
have other specializations.

This result, however, is

counter to Hypothesis 2c, which posited that an
environmental specialization would fit best with domain
creation strategy.
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Another important finding is that a core specialization
never outperformed other specializations.

This

specialization had lower performance when matched with
domain offense strategy (Hypothesis 2b) and in dealing with
environmental complexity (Hypothesis 6a).

These results

offer some support for earlier research that recommended
replacing incumbent managers to overcome organizational
inertia.

These results, however, only point to the benefit

of replacing managers when their experience is limited to
one company or to production within one industry.
Analysis of the stock hypotheses (Hypotheses 2d and 2e)
also provided interesting results.

First, contrary to

expectations, increased TMG stock ownership led to decreased
performance in terms of slack.

Three possible explanations

may account for these contrary findings.

First, these

results may reflect increased risk taking propensity by
incumbent or new management in a turnaround situation
because of a firm's poor performance.

Prospect theory

argues that when faced with poor performance, a TMG may
engage in risk-seeking behaviors in hopes of reversing a
firm's fortunes (Bowman, 1980? Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

Because TMG members that owned

stock in a declining firm faced financial risk from
declining stock value along with human capital risk from job
loss if a firm failed (cf. Zajac & Westphal, 1994), they may
have engaged in risk-seeking behaviors in an attempt to
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turnaround.

Taking on additional debt and lowering

liquidity increased the risk of firm, but these actions also
provided additional capital for investing in actions that
may have led to turnaround.
Second, these results may reflect increasing risk
taking propensity of new managers.

Average management

turnover was 49.27 percent (sd = 34.20)
information available.

in firms with stock

Thus, on average, half of the TMG in

each firm consisted of new managers.

If these new managers

had higher risk-taking propensities than incumbent managers,
this could also account for increased debt usage and lower
liquidity.

This view of new managers as risk takers is

consistent with the psychological profile of turnaround
managers noted in the practitioner literature (e.g.,
Bibeault, 1982; Gerstein & Reisman, 1983).
Third,

in terms of potential slack, these results may

reflect an attempt to increase stockholder wealth by
increasing a firm's leverage.

Because interest on debt is

tax-deductible, TMGs may be able to pass a portion of a
firm's cost of capital from stockholders to the government
(Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).

Consequently, within limits,

TMGs can create value for stockholders (including
themselves) by taking on additional debt (Kaplan, 1989).
In terms of examining the effect of a firm's
environment on its turnaround effort, the present study
moved beyond narrow views of the environment such as
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industry growth rates to examine a broader view of
environmental munificence.

Additionally, the role of

environmental dynamism and complexity were also examined.
Results show that a firm's environment has only a limited
relation with its turnaround.

Dynamism and complexity were

significantly related only to profitability.
Support for this hypothesis would have indicated that
environmental determinism plays a major role in
organizational turnaround (cf. Hannan & Freeman,
Scherer, 1980).

1977, 1984;

As with Hypothesis 1, however, the lack of

significance for these variables should not be surprising.
Although the environment is an important component affecting
a firm's alignment, examining only a firm's environmental
characteristics may present too narrow of an explanation.
Evidence that firms can sustain performance even in
industries experiencing decreasing demand (Harrigan, 1980;
Zammuto & Cameron, 1984) and that firms can fail even in
industries experiencing increasing demand (D'Aveni, 1989)
provides additional support for moving beyond a narrow focus
on environmental characteristics.

Furthermore, previous

research has also shown that environmental characteristics
have a limited impact on firm performance relative to firmspecific factors such as strategy (Rumelt, 1991).

Thus,

other factors along with environmental factors need to be
considered when examining how firms regain alignment and
turnaround.
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These results should not be interpreted as indicating
that environmental characteristics do not affect a f i r m ’s
turnaround.

The effect of the environment, however, may

depend on each firm's situation.

For example, additional

analysis showed that munificence is significantly related to
profitability (p<.05) for firms implementing a retrenchment
strategy and to profitability relative to the risk free rate
(pc.Ol) for firms implementing a domain creation strategy.
These results indicate that environmental characteristics
can affect turnaround.

Focusing only on environmental

variables as a factor in a firm's turnaround, however, is
too narrow a view and other factors need to be considered.
The integrative hypotheses

(Hypotheses 4 through 6)

begin to provide insight into the complexity of the
turnaround process.

Turnaround strategy (Hypothesis 1) was

not significant and environmental characteristics
(Hypothesis 3) were limited in explaining performance.

When

the combined effects of turnaround strategy, TMG
characteristics, and environment characteristics were
examined, however, some differences in performance occurred.
Although these results are limited, they provide some
evidence of performance benefits gained from achieving fit
between a firm's strategy, TMG characteristics, and
environment.
Overall, these results indicate that focusing on
important components of a firm's alignment may provide
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insights into the turnaround process.

Moreover, because the

dissertation employs a cross-industry sample, these results
should be generalizable.

This generalizability, however,

does trade off specific recommendations for a given
industry.

This and other limitations will be discussed

next.
Limitations of results
As with all studies, this dissertation has limitations
that should be noted.

These include limited statistical

power, survival bias, limited focus on process variables,
and sample characteristics.
discussed next.

These limitations will be

Theoretical and measurement issues will

also be highlighted.
Statistical power
Even drawing from a large database such as COMPUSTAT,
sample size may serve as an explanation for lack of
significance for some of the hypotheses.

This lack of power

became especially problematic for Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6
where the maximum power attained was only .32 (Cohen, 1977)
because of the small sample sizes created by dividing firms
by strategy and then again by TMG specialization.

Thus,

results should be viewed as conservative tests of these
hypotheses.
One way to overcome this limitation may be to relax the
stringent performance definition employed in this
dissertation.

For the current study, firms had to have

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155
profitability below the risk-free rate and decreasing slack
for three years.
dire straits.

Thus, firms that were selected were in

Other recent research (e.g., Robbins &

Pearce, 1992) has examined decline employing a two-year time
horizon.

Given the severity of the present decline

definition, relaxing this definition slightly may be
warranted.

Less stringent criteria would still indicate

that a firm was in decline, but these criteria would also
allow for a larger sample to be selected to investigate
these hypotheses.
Survival bias
Another limitation of the reported investigation is
that all the firms in the focal sample were still
operational at the end ofthe focal timeframe.

What

is not

apparent from these results is how many firms implemented a
strategy or attained a strategy-TMG match and still failed
(i.e., declared bankruptcy).

Thus, including these failed

firms may impact the results found in this dissertation (cf.
Barker & Mone, 1994).

Additional research is needed to

examine the extent of this survival bias especially in
turnaround literature where firm survival is such a focal
issue.
Process variables
A third limitation to the present study is that it
examines each firm's realized strategy (Mintzberg, 1978).
The process of how a turnaround strategy is decided upon,
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the political process involved within a firm facing decline,
and issues related to implementing the strategy throughout
the firm were not examined.

For example, TMG backgrounds

may predispose them to selecting a particular turnaround
strategy (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).

Process issues in a

turnaround are undoubtedly critical in the turnaround
process (Barker & Mone, 1994) but were beyond the scope of
the present dissertation.
Sample characteristics
Although this cross-industry sample may be
generalizable,

it also has some limitations.

from this dissertation are general.

First, results

Specific decline

situations in different industries may require that
additional variables be considered.
these variables are discussed below.

Suggestions for some of
Second, only U.S.

public firms are included in this sample.

Private firms may

have different turnaround issues because owners may have
different goals and different required rates of return than
stockholders in public firms (Porter, 1980).

Additional

research is also necessary to see if these results
generalize to non-U.S. firms because of different industry
structures and stakeholder relations (Porter, 1990).
Measurement issues
Some possible limitations related to measuring
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental variables
should also be noted.

In terms of strategy, the lack of a
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domain consolidation strategy needs to be addressed.

In

this study, domain consolidation was grouped together with
an efficiency strategy.

Although both strategies involve

cutting back on assets and expenses, domain consolidation
represents a much more drastic strategy.

The fact that this

strategy did not emerge as a distinct strategy in the
present sample is surprising given the recent increased
frequency of corporate domain consolidation (Cameron,
Freeman, & Mishra, 1993; DeWitt, 1993).
reasons may explain this result.

Two possible

First, firms may only take

drastic action such as selling entire divisions when faced
with severe decline situations (Bibeault, 1982).
Consequently, several firms implementing this strategy may
have been eliminated from the sample because they eventually
went bankrupt.

This possibility again highlights potential

survival bias within the sample.

Second, the measures

employed for domain initiative and domain reduction may need
further refinement.

Although these measures have been

employed in previous research (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) and
have been found to be valid measures for assessing changes
in a firm's domain (Montgomery, 1982) , they may be too
coarse to differentiate between retrenchment and domain
consolidation.

A possible alternative may be to employ an

entropy measure of diversification (Palepu, 1985) that
weights the relative size of a firm's business segments
based on sales.

Employing this finer-grained measure would
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also allow investigation into whether firms sell major
divisions in turnaround attempts or trim peripheral
divisions in their attempts to regain alignment and turn around.
Measurement issues related to TMG characteristics also
need to be addressed.

The limited findings suggest that

four issues may be important.

First, different TMG

characteristics may have only a limited impact on a TMG's
ability to implement a turnaround strategy.

Some

researchers have suggested that TMGs may not be as
influenced by functional "blinders" as academics have
proposed (Walsh, 1988) or that decision making changes so
much at the top level that TMGs must move beyond their
functional biases and rely on a wider range of information
sources (Waller, Huber, & Glick, 1995).

Thus, although TMG

characteristics have been shown to impact the strategyperformance relation for some strategies (e.g.,
diversification strategy, Michel & Hambrick, 1993), this
impact may be limited in the context of turnaround
strategies.
Second, the TMG specialization typology employed in
this dissertation may need to be reconsidered.

This

typology has several advantages over previous
classifications including it is theoretically based and
empirically derived, it integrates functional specialization
and executive employment within a firm into a single
measure, and it overcomes problems in previous research
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resulting from using different operationalizations of TMG
characteristics.

The typology, however, was developed at

the individual level of analysis and may not be as
applicable at the group level (i.e., TMGs).

Specifically,

because each TMG was not a "pure" type (i.e., each team
consisted of managers with core, administrative, and
environmental backgrounds), error may have been introduced.
Although hypotheses were developed recognizing that TMGs
would have a "dominant background" instead of a "pure
background", the fact that some TMGs were classified as
having a particular specialization when the TMG had less
than half of its members from that specialization may have
influenced the results.
Third, the method employed in this dissertation to
designate each firm's TMG may not have accounted for all a
firm's TMG members.

TMGs have been measured in several ways

including inside board members (Bantel & Finkelstein, 1994),
top two management levels (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), mangers
above the level of vice president (Michel & Hambrick, 1992),
or managers designated by the CEO (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).
Although asking CEOs exactly who was a member of the TMG may
have been a preferable method,

limited access to top

managers and possible problems from recalling TMG members up
to 20 years ago precluded employing this approach.
Fourth, the relation between TMG characteristics and
strategy may be conceptualized incorrectly.

Following the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
majority of previous TMG-strategy interaction research
(e.g., Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Michel & Hambrick, 1992),
this dissertation hypothesized that firms whose TMGs have
specializations that match particular turnaround strategies
would outperform firms whose TMGs do not have this match.
This hypothesis was tested by examining performance
differences across TMG specializations for each strategy.
Thus, the dissertation tested this relation employing a
moderation perspective.

Although moderation represents one

way of examining performance effects of TMG-strategy fit,
other perspectives exist (Hambrick, 1989).

One alternative

conceptualization may be that turnaround strategy and TMG
characteristics are only two of several important variables
in examining turnaround.

Consequently, insights may be

possible from examining turnaround from a configurational
approach (Miller & Friesen, 1977; Mintzberg, 1990).

Under

this conceptualization of fit, firms could be classified
employing a set of theoretical attributes to derive profiles
of successful and unsuccessful turnaround strategies (cf.
Hambrick, 1983).

This conceptualization would allow

expanding beyond the linear, bivariate relation between
turnaround strategy and TMG specialization examined in this
dissertation to include other potentially important
variables such as a TMG's decision processes (Staw et a l . ,
1981) and a firm's external relations (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978).

This conceptualization would also facilitate
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assessing the possibility that more than one turnaround
configuration can be successful within a particular
environment (i.e., equifinality could be investigated; Doty,
Glick, & Huber, 1993; Venkatraman, 1989).
Methodological issues related to the stock hypotheses
also need to be addressed.

Previous research based on

agency theory hypothesized a positive relation between TMG
stock ownership and a firm's performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Thus, this relation was also hypothesized to apply in
turnaround situations (Hypothesis 2d).

Recent empirical

evidence has shown, however, that the relation between TMG
stock ownership and a firm's performance may not be linear.
Specifically, as a TMG increases its stock ownership, a
larger percentage of the TMG's income is tied to a firm's
performance.

Consequently, a TMG may become risk averse and

make decisions that run counter to stockholder wealth
maximization beyond some ownership point because a greater
part of the TMG's income is at risk (Wright, Ferris, Sarin,
& Awasthi, 1996).

Thus, the linear relation hypothesized in

this dissertation may not hold over the entire range of TMG
stock ownership.
Additionally, agency theory contends that TMGs have an
incentive to implement a domain creation strategy to
diversify their employment risk, even if this strategy does
not create additional value for stockholders (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).

When TMGs own stock in the company, their
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interests become more aligned with stockholders and,
therefore, it is expected that they would only implement a
domain creation strategy if this strategy was expected to
create value.

Thus, the relation between TMG stock

ownership and turnaround should be higher when firms
implement a domain creation strategy then under other
strategies (Hypothesis 2e).

Theoretical and methodological

issues may account for a lack of significant findings for
this hypothesis.

First, in terms of theoretical issues, the

findings may result from applying agency theory arguments to
a situation where such arguments may not hold.
Specifically, according to agency theory, a TMG may
diversify a firm to reduce a firm's risk and, by extension,
the TMG's employment risk.

This reduction in a firm's risk,

however, results from stabilizing (i.e., reducing the
variability of) the firm's income stream.

Although

stabilizing a firm's income stream can reduce the threat of
bankruptcy (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994), stabilizing this
income stream at a low level of performance could actually
increase a TMG's employment risk because TMGs may be fired
for a firm's chronic poor performance.

Thus, the unique

situation faced by TMGs in turnaround situations may limit
agency theory arguments.
Additionally, the findings may result from three
methodological issues.

In this sample, only 18 firms

implementing a domain creation strategy had stock data
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available.
results.

Thus, a larger sample may have yielded stronger
A second methodological issue occurs because the

stock data were collected over the entire decline and
turnaround process.

Some firms, however, experienced

dramatic changes in the amount of stock ownership (e.g., the
departure of a founder).

Thus, a shorter timeframe may be

required to investigate the effect of stock ownership.
Third, from a measurement perspective, these results could
have also occurred because a TMG's stock options were not
included.

Because of the theoretical difficulties in

valuing these options presented above, the hypotheses were
tested without including options.

Options, however, may

substantially alter a TMG's stock holdings and, thus, TMG
members' motives.

For example, during Chrysler's

performance nadir in 1981, the company's CEO, Lee Iacocca,
only owned 1000 shares of Chrysler stock.

He held options,

however, that gave him the right to acquire up to an
additional 320,000 shares (Chrvsler's 10-K. 1981).
Consequently, additional research may be warranted to
determine if stock options impact the results found in this
study.
Measurement issues may also have impacted the
environmental hypotheses.

Three possible explanations exist

for the limited significant results for these hypotheses.
First, the variables employed may have inadequately measured
environmental characteristics.

For example, Dess and Beard
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(1984) define dynamism as change that is difficult to
predict and that heightens uncertainty for TMGs.

The

measure of dynamism employed in this dissertation does gauge
variability of sales and employment, but these measures may
not tap into the "unpredictability" of this variability.
Although this measurement issue may provide a partial
explanation for the limited results, previous research
(e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988; Palmer, 1994) supports the use of
these variables to measure environmental characteristics.
Second, these results may have occurred because of the
timeframe employed by the study.

Two environmental

variables, munificence and dynamism, were measured as
changes in these characteristics over a firm's entire
decline.

Previous research has shown, however, that an

environment's impact on a firm in financial trouble may be
sudden and dramatic.

For example, Hambrick and D'Aveni

(1988) found that firms experiencing a downward performance
spiral often failed following a sudden environmental shift.
Environmental variables, therefore, may have to be measured
employing a shorter timeframe.

Third, the results may have

occurred because of the characteristics of the particular
sample employed.

The mean sales growth rate for industries

was 8.91 (sd = 5.16), which indicates that most firms were
operating in mature industries (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984).
These industries are characterized by slow growth and
established market shares (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165
Consequently, most firms in the sample operated in fairly
predictable environments.

The relation between

environmental variables and turnaround may be stronger in
emergent or growth industries (cf. Eisenhardt &
Schoonhooven, 1991).
Future research
The results and limitations of this dissertation also
indicate possible future research opportunities.

These

possibilities will be discussed in terms of turnaround
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental variables.
In examining turnaround strategies, future research
could adopt a resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991;
Wernerfelt, 1984) and examine the implications that
resources have on the relation between turnaround strategy
and performance.

This dissertation examined TMG

backgrounds, which can serve as resources for firms
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991).

Other variables that future

research could examine include a firm's brand name and
organizational culture (Barney, 1991).
In terms of examining TMG issues, future research could
also examine the role of other key stakeholders and their
influence on a TMG's actions.

First, institutions with

large stock holdings (e.g., pension funds) in a declining
company may exert important influence on TMG's actions
(Bethel & Liebeskind,

1993).

Second, from a resource

dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), other
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stakeholders may play an important role in turnaround.

For

example, the role of a firm's board of directors may be an
important variable because outside directors may be able to
provide access to capital (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993;
Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).
Future research could also investigate other aspects of
TMG-strategy interaction.

This dissertation is the first to

investigate the effects of TMG-strategy interaction on
turnaround, and future studies could build on findings in
this study.

For example, hypotheses in this dissertation

examining domain creation looked only at this strategy in
general as expanding beyond a firm's current industry scope.
Another factor to consider would be whether this domain
creation results in related or unrelated diversification
(Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989).

The TMG specializations

may have different interaction effects for these different
types of domain creation.

For example, for related

diversification, an administrative specialization may fit
better with the strategy whereas for unrelated
diversification, an environmental specialization might
provide a better match (cf. Michel & Hambrick, 1992).
Future research could also examine additional
environmental characteristics that impact turnaround.

This

dissertation investigated environmental variables
munificence, dynamism, and complexity to examine industry
variables, but other industry variables may also warrant
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future research.

One such variable is the amount of

managerial discretion present in an industry (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick &
Finkelstein, 1987).

Managerial discretion represents the

degree of latitude managers have in making organizational
decisions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).

For example, a

utility company's TMG has to contend with regulatory
constraints that allow fewer strategic choices than the TMG
of a computer company (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1992).

In a

turnaround context, this ability to make strategic decisions
may also be critical.

For example, although domain

consolidation represents a possible turnaround strategy,
some firms may face barriers to exiting an industry such as
severance contracts, nonmarketable assets, emotional
attachment, or relationship with other business units within
the firm (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Porter, 1980).

Leaving an

industry or major segment, therefore, may be prohibitively
expensive for firms facing these barriers even if the firm's
performance within a particular industry has declined
substantially.

Consequently, the performance implications

of turnaround strategies such as domain consolidation may
vary with different levels of managerial discretion.
Summary
This dissertation has examined issues related to
organizational turnaround.

It has examined the role of

strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment and found
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that employing an integrative view provided insight into the
turnaround process.

In addition, the dissertation developed

a continuum of turnaround strategies and highlighted
important performance measurement issues that should be
considered in future research.

Finally, it discussed some

limitations and presented ideas for future research.
In conclusion, this dissertation begins to provide
insights into important aspects of the turnaround process
and provides the basis for future research.

It shows that

there are no simple answers in turnaround (e.g., implement
one best strategy or simply replace all the managers), and
it offers a broader conceptualization of the turnaround
process.
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NOTES
Top management groups have been defined differently
across studies.
In general, the term top-management group
refers to the upper tier of management that is responsible
for formulating and implementing strategic direction.
A
firm's chief executive officer (or president), chief
operating officer, and vice presidents in charge of major
corporate divisions are generally included in the
definition.
Zm Stanwick (1992) is the only study that empirically
examines management characteristics in turnaround
situations.
In this study, he investigated the impact that
the source (i.e., insider versus outsider) and functional
background of a newly-hired CEO has on turnaround strategy
selection and subsequent performance.
The dissertation will
build on these results by investigating how TMG
characteristics interact with particular turnaround
strategies and how this interaction affects turnaround
performance.

3- Ramanujam's finding that 90.3 percent of manufacturing
firms in the COMPUSTAT data base experienced three or more
years of declining ROI from 1962-1979 raises further doubts
about the adequacy of employing only profitability to
measure decline and turnaround.
The Miles/Zammuto/Cameron classification scheme also
includes "domain defense" and "domain substitution"
strategies.
Domain defense involves political strategies
and building external support.
Domain substitution involves
moving into a totally new business in situations where a
firm's current niche totally collapses.
Both of these
strategies fall outside the scope of this dissertation and,
therefore, are reserved for future research.
5* Research on TMGs has also examined the role of other
characteristics such as age or educational background.
Little evidence exists, however, in the decline and
turnaround literature that would suggest that these
characteristics affect implementation of a turnaround
strategy.
6* White et al.'s (1994) framework for classifying TMGs
according to career experiences offers three major benefits
relative to previous operationalizations.
First, their
typology is theoretically based and empirically derived from
a sample of 544 Fortune 1000 executives.
Second, their
typology integrates functional specialization and executive
employment with a company (i.e., insider versus outsider)
into a single measure.
This measure allows researchers to
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make important distinctions such as differentiating among
executives who have spent their entire career with one
company from these who have spent their entire career within
one industry, but with several companies from those who have
career experiences in several industries.
Third, the
typology overcomes problems in previous research resulting
from different operationalizations of TMG characteristics.
For example, previous studies have defined TMG functional
specializations using classification schemes ranging from 2
possible functions (Thomas et al., 1991) to 12 possible
functions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). These different
operationalizations have made comparisons across studies
difficult.
7* Bourgeois (1981) argues that slack can also represent
inefficiency within an organization.
He contends that the
correlation between slack and effectiveness may be inverted
U-shaped because too much slack may indicate severe
inefficiency.
Given the proposed study's focus low slack
situations, however, problems associated with excess slack
are unlikely to be a problem.
Future research should also
explore problems and remedies for firms that have too much
slack which could build on the "success breeds failure"
argument (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).
8- Other measures of slack have also been suggested.
For
example, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) and Singh (1986) used
selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales as a
measure of slack.
This measure, however, may reflect
inefficiency more than slack (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988).
9* Although examining expenses such as advertising
separately would have been preferable, COMPUSTAT often
aggregates these expenses under sales, general, and
administrative (SGA) expenses.
SGA includes marketing and
advertising expenses, however, and, thus, provides a
suitable measure for expenses.
10- The data were not standardized prior to cluster analysis
for two reasons.
First, standardization may reduce or
eliminate meaningful differences among variables (Edelbrock,
1979; Ketchen & Shook, in press).
Second, because all
variables were measured as a percentage change from a base
year, the ranges did not markedly differ across variables
(Hair et al., 1992).
11* The severity of firm's financial health can be
determined employing Altman's (1988) .Z-score by comparing it
to the following scale:
Z =

3.00 or above indicates that a firm will not go
bankrupt.
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Z =

1.81 or below indicates that a firm will go
bankrupt.

Z =

between 1.81 and 3.00 falls into a "zone of
ignorance" for predicting whether the firm will go
bankrupt.

12- The market share measure precluded considering focus
strategies in the regression equation.
Although this is a
limitation, it may not be a major concern given that the
sample is comprised of large, public firms and each firm's
market share is measured in its primary industry.
These
large firms are unlikely to employ a focus strategy in their
primary markets.
13- For example, employing the same source for TMG data as
this dissertation, Barbosa (1985) found 82 percent of a
random sample of corporate officers identified their own
dominant functional background as the same as he had
identified from Dun and Bradstreet's Reference Book of
Corporate Management.
14’ Note that an analysis employing a Harris-Kaiser
orthogonal rotation, which accounts for correlations among
factors, yielded similar results.
15- Note that analyses including the outliers obtained
similar results.
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